Economic analysis of state legal interventions in lease relationships on the idea of market efficiency and its failures

Lease is one of the most important legal relationships that, by its economic and social dimensions, has been a main concern for statesmen of any country. In Iran, since modern legislation, the question of how to regulate the relationships has been subject to ups and downs. Civil Code may be understo...

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Main Authors: Abbas Toosi, Javad Kashani
Format: Article
Language:fas
Published: Allameh Tabataba'i University Press 2020-02-01
Series:Faṣlnāmah-i Pizhūhish-i Huqūq-i Khuṣūṣī
Subjects:
Online Access:https://jplr.atu.ac.ir/article_10859_91039a668a4f479e113e3664a4d1b9cc.pdf
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author Abbas Toosi
Javad Kashani
author_facet Abbas Toosi
Javad Kashani
author_sort Abbas Toosi
collection DOAJ
description Lease is one of the most important legal relationships that, by its economic and social dimensions, has been a main concern for statesmen of any country. In Iran, since modern legislation, the question of how to regulate the relationships has been subject to ups and downs. Civil Code may be understood as a starting point based on the autonomy of will (supply and demand). Influenced by some evolutions, the lease gradually came to be a critical contract so that statesmen authorized themselves to intervene in leasing relationships. Looking at such lease Acts proves such interventionist trend. The trend, however, ceased to continue following Islamic revolution and by passing of the 1376 Act, it came back to its starting point (Civil Code). Such a turning fitted to the idea of market efficiency. This paper examines the said interventions on the idea of market efficiency first by reviewing the lease Acts in terms of interventionism and then by using economic theory, it examines some situations known as market failures and shows that the interventionist Acts of lease cannot be explained on the basis of market failure.
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spelling doaj.art-a465d41c3f3343b2899075c59e9b781a2023-12-26T07:48:46ZfasAllameh Tabataba'i University PressFaṣlnāmah-i Pizhūhish-i Huqūq-i Khuṣūṣī2345-35832476-62322020-02-0182915919010.22054/jplr.2019.37995.206510859Economic analysis of state legal interventions in lease relationships on the idea of market efficiency and its failuresAbbas Toosi0Javad Kashani1private law- law faculty- allameh university.Associate Professor private law, Allameh Tabataba’I University,Tehran, IRAN.Lease is one of the most important legal relationships that, by its economic and social dimensions, has been a main concern for statesmen of any country. In Iran, since modern legislation, the question of how to regulate the relationships has been subject to ups and downs. Civil Code may be understood as a starting point based on the autonomy of will (supply and demand). Influenced by some evolutions, the lease gradually came to be a critical contract so that statesmen authorized themselves to intervene in leasing relationships. Looking at such lease Acts proves such interventionist trend. The trend, however, ceased to continue following Islamic revolution and by passing of the 1376 Act, it came back to its starting point (Civil Code). Such a turning fitted to the idea of market efficiency. This paper examines the said interventions on the idea of market efficiency first by reviewing the lease Acts in terms of interventionism and then by using economic theory, it examines some situations known as market failures and shows that the interventionist Acts of lease cannot be explained on the basis of market failure.https://jplr.atu.ac.ir/article_10859_91039a668a4f479e113e3664a4d1b9cc.pdfmarket efficiencymarket failuremonopolypublic goodsinformation asymmetricexternalitieslegal intervention
spellingShingle Abbas Toosi
Javad Kashani
Economic analysis of state legal interventions in lease relationships on the idea of market efficiency and its failures
Faṣlnāmah-i Pizhūhish-i Huqūq-i Khuṣūṣī
market efficiency
market failure
monopoly
public goods
information asymmetric
externalities
legal intervention
title Economic analysis of state legal interventions in lease relationships on the idea of market efficiency and its failures
title_full Economic analysis of state legal interventions in lease relationships on the idea of market efficiency and its failures
title_fullStr Economic analysis of state legal interventions in lease relationships on the idea of market efficiency and its failures
title_full_unstemmed Economic analysis of state legal interventions in lease relationships on the idea of market efficiency and its failures
title_short Economic analysis of state legal interventions in lease relationships on the idea of market efficiency and its failures
title_sort economic analysis of state legal interventions in lease relationships on the idea of market efficiency and its failures
topic market efficiency
market failure
monopoly
public goods
information asymmetric
externalities
legal intervention
url https://jplr.atu.ac.ir/article_10859_91039a668a4f479e113e3664a4d1b9cc.pdf
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