Double Standards of International Recognition: Right vs. Might?
Why do some states get recognized, while others are denied the privilege? This article examines the underlying logic behind the contingency and inconsistency in the application of statehood standards to unrecognized, de facto states. When it comes to the practice of state recognition, the article ar...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | Russian |
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MGIMO University Press
2020-12-01
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| Series: | Международная аналитика |
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| Online Access: | https://www.interanalytics.org/jour/article/view/293 |
| Summary: | Why do some states get recognized, while others are denied the privilege? This article examines the underlying logic behind the contingency and inconsistency in the application of statehood standards to unrecognized, de facto states. When it comes to the practice of state recognition, the article argues, it is not merely a question of Great Power politics. Nor is it a question of whether a state has earned sovereignty and thus has a legally rightful claim to international recognition. Instead, the norms of state recognition can be better understood as a reflection of the balance of powers in the international order, rather than being a guiding principle for assessing claims to statehood. Central to this balance is the question of whether right corresponds with might and vice versa. If such a balance is absent, we observe what are considered to be double standards in the practice of international recognition. The theoretical framework draws on Baruch Spinoza’s idea of right being coextensive with power. Based on this assumption, the article demonstrates that the problem is not the incoherence of norms regulating international recognition, but rather the absence of a necessary equilibrium between might and right to ensure the universal applicability of those norms. The argument is illustrated through a comparison of the right to self-determination that was granted to peoples in former colonies during the Cold War period and the US-led recognition of Kosovo, followed by Russia’s recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia in 2008. The article shows that the practice of international recognition is conditional on global responses to particular concerns and circumstances. It is thus contingent on the degree to which powers agree as to how to address these concerns. The key suggestion put forward in the article is that, ultimately, there is no significant conceptual difference between the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples that marked the shift from the achievement of eff ective statehood to eventual independence and the 2008 wave of recognitions for non-colonial cases. Both show that norms and their enforcement depend on the same logic of right and power being mutually constitutive. |
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| ISSN: | 2587-8476 2541-9633 |