When your anchor sinks your boat: Information asymmetry in distributive negotiations and the disadvantage of making the first offer
The literature on behavioral decision-making and negotiations to date usually advocates first-mover advantage in distributive negotiations, and bases this preference on the anchoring heuristic. In the following paper, we suggest that the preference for moving first vs. moving second in negotiations...
| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Cambridge University Press
2017-09-01
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| Series: | Judgment and Decision Making |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://journal.sjdm.org/17/17327a/jdm17327a.pdf |
| _version_ | 1797720849924489216 |
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| author | Yossi Maaravi Aharon Levy |
| author_facet | Yossi Maaravi Aharon Levy |
| author_sort | Yossi Maaravi |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | The literature on
behavioral decision-making and negotiations to date usually advocates
first-mover advantage in distributive negotiations, and bases this preference
on the anchoring heuristic. In the following paper, we suggest that the
preference for moving first vs. moving second in negotiations may not be as
clear-cut as presumed, especially in situations characterized by information
asymmetry between negotiating counterparts. In Study 1, we examined people's
initiation preferences and found that unless taught otherwise, people
intuitively often prefer to move second. In Studies 2--4, we experimentally
tested the suggested advantage of moving second, and demonstrated that in
information-asymmetry scenarios – when one party has perfect background
information and the other has none --- it is actually preferable for both
counterparts not to give the first offer while negotiating. We discuss the
implications of our findings on the field of negotiation and decision-making,
and lay the groundwork for future studies examining this issue. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-12T09:25:33Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-a525290d68da44599f2126387998c0ec |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 1930-2975 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-12T09:25:33Z |
| publishDate | 2017-09-01 |
| publisher | Cambridge University Press |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Judgment and Decision Making |
| spelling | doaj.art-a525290d68da44599f2126387998c0ec2023-09-02T14:16:18ZengCambridge University PressJudgment and Decision Making1930-29752017-09-01125420429When your anchor sinks your boat: Information asymmetry in distributive negotiations and the disadvantage of making the first offerYossi MaaraviAharon LevyThe literature on behavioral decision-making and negotiations to date usually advocates first-mover advantage in distributive negotiations, and bases this preference on the anchoring heuristic. In the following paper, we suggest that the preference for moving first vs. moving second in negotiations may not be as clear-cut as presumed, especially in situations characterized by information asymmetry between negotiating counterparts. In Study 1, we examined people's initiation preferences and found that unless taught otherwise, people intuitively often prefer to move second. In Studies 2--4, we experimentally tested the suggested advantage of moving second, and demonstrated that in information-asymmetry scenarios – when one party has perfect background information and the other has none --- it is actually preferable for both counterparts not to give the first offer while negotiating. We discuss the implications of our findings on the field of negotiation and decision-making, and lay the groundwork for future studies examining this issue.http://journal.sjdm.org/17/17327a/jdm17327a.pdffirst offer anchoring negotiation second offer second-mover advantage information asymmetryNAKeywords |
| spellingShingle | Yossi Maaravi Aharon Levy When your anchor sinks your boat: Information asymmetry in distributive negotiations and the disadvantage of making the first offer Judgment and Decision Making first offer anchoring negotiation second offer second-mover advantage information asymmetryNAKeywords |
| title | When your anchor
sinks your boat: Information asymmetry in distributive negotiations and the
disadvantage of making the first offer |
| title_full | When your anchor
sinks your boat: Information asymmetry in distributive negotiations and the
disadvantage of making the first offer |
| title_fullStr | When your anchor
sinks your boat: Information asymmetry in distributive negotiations and the
disadvantage of making the first offer |
| title_full_unstemmed | When your anchor
sinks your boat: Information asymmetry in distributive negotiations and the
disadvantage of making the first offer |
| title_short | When your anchor
sinks your boat: Information asymmetry in distributive negotiations and the
disadvantage of making the first offer |
| title_sort | when your anchor sinks your boat information asymmetry in distributive negotiations and the disadvantage of making the first offer |
| topic | first offer anchoring negotiation second offer second-mover advantage information asymmetryNAKeywords |
| url | http://journal.sjdm.org/17/17327a/jdm17327a.pdf |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT yossimaaravi whenyouranchorsinksyourboatinformationasymmetryindistributivenegotiationsandthedisadvantageofmakingthefirstoffer AT aharonlevy whenyouranchorsinksyourboatinformationasymmetryindistributivenegotiationsandthedisadvantageofmakingthefirstoffer |