Grid Cyber-Security Strategy in an Attacker-Defender Model
The progression of cyber-attacks on the cyber-physical system is analyzed by the Probabilistic, Learning Attacker, and Dynamic Defender (PLADD) model. Although our research does apply to all cyber-physical systems, we focus on power grid infrastructure. The PLADD model evaluates the effectiveness of...
| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
MDPI AG
2021-04-01
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| Series: | Cryptography |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://www.mdpi.com/2410-387X/5/2/12 |
| _version_ | 1827696081376378880 |
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| author | Yu-Cheng Chen Vincent John Mooney Santiago Grijalva |
| author_facet | Yu-Cheng Chen Vincent John Mooney Santiago Grijalva |
| author_sort | Yu-Cheng Chen |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | The progression of cyber-attacks on the cyber-physical system is analyzed by the Probabilistic, Learning Attacker, and Dynamic Defender (PLADD) model. Although our research does apply to all cyber-physical systems, we focus on power grid infrastructure. The PLADD model evaluates the effectiveness of moving target defense (MTD) techniques. We consider the power grid attack scenarios in the AND configurations and OR configurations. In addition, we consider, for the first time ever, power grid attack scenarios involving both AND configurations and OR configurations simultaneously. Cyber-security managers can use the strategy introduced in this manuscript to optimize their defense strategies. Specifically, our research provides insight into when to reset access controls (such as passwords, internet protocol addresses, and session keys), to minimize the probability of a successful attack. Our mathematical proof for the OR configuration of multiple PLADD games shows that it is best if all access controls are reset simultaneously. For the AND configuration, our mathematical proof shows that it is best (in terms of minimizing the attacker′s average probability of success) that the resets are equally spaced apart. We introduce a novel concept called hierarchical parallel PLADD system to cover additional attack scenarios that require combinations of AND and OR configurations. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-10T12:39:51Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-a5a2adb202c643f09b508bf46f9568cd |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 2410-387X |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-10T12:39:51Z |
| publishDate | 2021-04-01 |
| publisher | MDPI AG |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Cryptography |
| spelling | doaj.art-a5a2adb202c643f09b508bf46f9568cd2023-11-21T14:00:29ZengMDPI AGCryptography2410-387X2021-04-01521210.3390/cryptography5020012Grid Cyber-Security Strategy in an Attacker-Defender ModelYu-Cheng Chen0Vincent John Mooney1Santiago Grijalva2School of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, GA 30332, USASchool of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, GA 30332, USASchool of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, GA 30332, USAThe progression of cyber-attacks on the cyber-physical system is analyzed by the Probabilistic, Learning Attacker, and Dynamic Defender (PLADD) model. Although our research does apply to all cyber-physical systems, we focus on power grid infrastructure. The PLADD model evaluates the effectiveness of moving target defense (MTD) techniques. We consider the power grid attack scenarios in the AND configurations and OR configurations. In addition, we consider, for the first time ever, power grid attack scenarios involving both AND configurations and OR configurations simultaneously. Cyber-security managers can use the strategy introduced in this manuscript to optimize their defense strategies. Specifically, our research provides insight into when to reset access controls (such as passwords, internet protocol addresses, and session keys), to minimize the probability of a successful attack. Our mathematical proof for the OR configuration of multiple PLADD games shows that it is best if all access controls are reset simultaneously. For the AND configuration, our mathematical proof shows that it is best (in terms of minimizing the attacker′s average probability of success) that the resets are equally spaced apart. We introduce a novel concept called hierarchical parallel PLADD system to cover additional attack scenarios that require combinations of AND and OR configurations.https://www.mdpi.com/2410-387X/5/2/12periodic resetattack graphcyber-physical systemscyber-physical securitymoving target defenses |
| spellingShingle | Yu-Cheng Chen Vincent John Mooney Santiago Grijalva Grid Cyber-Security Strategy in an Attacker-Defender Model Cryptography periodic reset attack graph cyber-physical systems cyber-physical security moving target defenses |
| title | Grid Cyber-Security Strategy in an Attacker-Defender Model |
| title_full | Grid Cyber-Security Strategy in an Attacker-Defender Model |
| title_fullStr | Grid Cyber-Security Strategy in an Attacker-Defender Model |
| title_full_unstemmed | Grid Cyber-Security Strategy in an Attacker-Defender Model |
| title_short | Grid Cyber-Security Strategy in an Attacker-Defender Model |
| title_sort | grid cyber security strategy in an attacker defender model |
| topic | periodic reset attack graph cyber-physical systems cyber-physical security moving target defenses |
| url | https://www.mdpi.com/2410-387X/5/2/12 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT yuchengchen gridcybersecuritystrategyinanattackerdefendermodel AT vincentjohnmooney gridcybersecuritystrategyinanattackerdefendermodel AT santiagogrijalva gridcybersecuritystrategyinanattackerdefendermodel |