The Lockean Prerogative, Natural Law, and Political Power
In this paper, I argue that Lockean prerogative power is political and not natural. After introducing two arguments in favour of the notion of prerogative as a natural power I offer two arguments contra this view. First, I claim that Locke’s conception of executive power is not unitary; rather, he...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Western Libraries, The University of Western Ontario
2020-09-01
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| Series: | Locke Studies |
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| Online Access: | https://ojs.lib.uwo.ca/index.php/locke/article/view/8056 |
| Summary: | In this paper, I argue that Lockean prerogative power is political and not natural. After introducing two arguments in favour of the notion of prerogative as a natural power I offer two arguments contra this view. First, I claim that Locke’s conception of executive power is not unitary; rather, he distinguishes between natural and political executive power. Second, I distinguish two types of public good; the general public good and the specific public good. Drawing on these two distinctions, I respond to the arguments in favour of a natural prerogative and argue that they fail.
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| ISSN: | 2561-925X |