Gödel’s Philosophical Challenge (to Turing)
DOI: http://doi.org/10.26333/sts.xxxiv1.03 The incompleteness theorems constitute the mathematical core of Gödel’s philosophical challenge. They are given in their “most satisfactory form”, as Gödel saw it, when the formality of theories to which they apply is characterized via Turing machines. T...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Polskie Towarzystwo Semiotyczne / The Polish Semiotic Society
2020-11-01
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| Series: | Studia Semiotyczne |
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| Online Access: | http://studiasemiotyczne.pts.edu.pl/index.php/Studiasemiotyczne/article/view/200 |
| Summary: | DOI: http://doi.org/10.26333/sts.xxxiv1.03
The incompleteness theorems constitute the mathematical core of Gödel’s philosophical challenge. They are given in their “most satisfactory form”, as Gödel saw it, when the formality of theories to which they apply is characterized via Turing machines. These machines codify human mechanical procedures that can be carried out without appealing to higher cognitive capacities. The question naturally arises, whether the theorems justify the claim that the human mind has mathematical abilities that are not shared by any machine. Turing admits that non-mechanical steps of intuition are needed to transcend particular formal theories. Thus, there is a substantive point in comparing Turing’s views with Gödel’s that is expressed by the assertion, “The human mind infinitely surpasses any finite machine”. The parallelisms and tensions between their views are taken as an inspiration for beginning to explore, computationally, the capacities of the human mathematical mind. |
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| ISSN: | 0137-6608 2544-073X |