| Özet: | Experiments on
economic games typically fail to find positive reputational effects of using
peer punishment of selfish behavior in social dilemmas. Theorists had expected
positive reputational effects because of the potentially beneficial
consequences that punishment may have on norm violators' behavior. Going beyond
the game-theoretic paradigm, we used vignettes to study how various social
factors influence approval ratings of a peer who reprimands a violator of a
group-beneficial norm. We found that ratings declined when punishers showed
anger, and this effect was mediated by perceived aggressiveness. Thus the same
emotions that motivate peer punishers may make them come across as aggressive,
to the detriment of their reputation. However, the negative effect of showing
anger disappeared when the norm violation was sufficiently severe. Ratings of
punishers were also influenced by social distance, such that it is less
appropriate for a stranger than a friend to reprimand a violator. In sum, peer
punisher ratings were very high for a friend reprimanding a severe norm
violation, but particularly poor for a stranger showing anger at a mild norm
violation. We found no effect on ratings of whether the reprimand had the
beneficial consequence of changing the violator's behavior. Our findings
provide insight into how peer punishers can avoid negative reputational
effects. They also point to the importance of going beyond economic games when
studying peer punishment.
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