Institutional Commitment Problems and Regional Autonomy: The Catalan Case

This article examines what constitutional arrangements are more likely to facilitate the transfer of effective decision-making power to the regional level. We show that certain constitutional arrangements can result in institutional commitment problems between regional minority and national majority...

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Main Authors: Francesc Amat, Toni Rodon
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Cogitatio 2021-12-01
Series:Politics and Governance
Subjects:
Online Access:https://www.cogitatiopress.com/politicsandgovernance/article/view/4607
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author Francesc Amat
Toni Rodon
author_facet Francesc Amat
Toni Rodon
author_sort Francesc Amat
collection DOAJ
description This article examines what constitutional arrangements are more likely to facilitate the transfer of effective decision-making power to the regional level. We show that certain constitutional arrangements can result in institutional commitment problems between regional minority and national majority groups, which in turn influence levels of regional autonomy across regions. Specifically, we examine how the depth and scope of decentralization depend on the presence of federal agreements and the availability of institutional guarantees that make the federal contracts credible. Analyzing regional-level data, we show that regions where identity minority groups are majoritarian enjoy more regional autonomy when the commitment problem has resulted in a satisfactory national accommodation. Our findings highlight two important scenarios. The first occurs when the institutional commitment problem is solved, and regional minority groups are granted substantial levels of regional autonomy. The second scenario takes place when the commitment problem is not institutionally accommodated, and hence regional minority groups have systematically lower levels of autonomy. This article illustrates that both federal contracts and credible agreements are important tools to understand regional decision-making powers.
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spelling doaj.art-a8c783e0b6c240f6aa7c7d041ec348382022-12-22T00:50:28ZengCogitatioPolitics and Governance2183-24632021-12-019443945210.17645/pag.v9i4.46072303Institutional Commitment Problems and Regional Autonomy: The Catalan CaseFrancesc Amat0Toni Rodon1Institutions and Political Economy Research Group, University of Barcelona, SpainDepartment of Political and Social Sciences, Pompeu Fabra University, SpainThis article examines what constitutional arrangements are more likely to facilitate the transfer of effective decision-making power to the regional level. We show that certain constitutional arrangements can result in institutional commitment problems between regional minority and national majority groups, which in turn influence levels of regional autonomy across regions. Specifically, we examine how the depth and scope of decentralization depend on the presence of federal agreements and the availability of institutional guarantees that make the federal contracts credible. Analyzing regional-level data, we show that regions where identity minority groups are majoritarian enjoy more regional autonomy when the commitment problem has resulted in a satisfactory national accommodation. Our findings highlight two important scenarios. The first occurs when the institutional commitment problem is solved, and regional minority groups are granted substantial levels of regional autonomy. The second scenario takes place when the commitment problem is not institutionally accommodated, and hence regional minority groups have systematically lower levels of autonomy. This article illustrates that both federal contracts and credible agreements are important tools to understand regional decision-making powers.https://www.cogitatiopress.com/politicsandgovernance/article/view/4607commitment problemfiscal autonomyregional autonomysovereignty demandsterritorial conflicts
spellingShingle Francesc Amat
Toni Rodon
Institutional Commitment Problems and Regional Autonomy: The Catalan Case
Politics and Governance
commitment problem
fiscal autonomy
regional autonomy
sovereignty demands
territorial conflicts
title Institutional Commitment Problems and Regional Autonomy: The Catalan Case
title_full Institutional Commitment Problems and Regional Autonomy: The Catalan Case
title_fullStr Institutional Commitment Problems and Regional Autonomy: The Catalan Case
title_full_unstemmed Institutional Commitment Problems and Regional Autonomy: The Catalan Case
title_short Institutional Commitment Problems and Regional Autonomy: The Catalan Case
title_sort institutional commitment problems and regional autonomy the catalan case
topic commitment problem
fiscal autonomy
regional autonomy
sovereignty demands
territorial conflicts
url https://www.cogitatiopress.com/politicsandgovernance/article/view/4607
work_keys_str_mv AT francescamat institutionalcommitmentproblemsandregionalautonomythecatalancase
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