CardioID: Secure ECG-BCG Agnostic Interaction-Free Device Pairing

Usably secure ad-hoc device pairing fosters connectivity with hardware which is difficult to access (e.g., implanted) and grants convenience for ad-hoc short-term on-off pairing patterns (e.g. shared public domain). Examples are medical devices or fitness equipment. We present CardioID, an approach...

Full description

Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Si Zuo, Stephan Sigg, Le Ngu Nguyen, Nils Beck, Nico Jahne-Raden, Marie Cathrine Wolf
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: IEEE 2022-01-01
Series:IEEE Access
Subjects:
Online Access:https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9969605/
_version_ 1811177629242359808
author Si Zuo
Stephan Sigg
Le Ngu Nguyen
Nils Beck
Nico Jahne-Raden
Marie Cathrine Wolf
author_facet Si Zuo
Stephan Sigg
Le Ngu Nguyen
Nils Beck
Nico Jahne-Raden
Marie Cathrine Wolf
author_sort Si Zuo
collection DOAJ
description Usably secure ad-hoc device pairing fosters connectivity with hardware which is difficult to access (e.g., implanted) and grants convenience for ad-hoc short-term on-off pairing patterns (e.g. shared public domain). Examples are medical devices or fitness equipment. We present CardioID, an approach to extract features from heart rate variability for secure pairing keys that change with the randomness inherited in heart operation. Our processing chain is compatible with electrocardiogram (ECG, voltage), as well as ballistocardiogram (BCG, acceleration) type signals. Dissimilarities in locally generated sequences are accounted for using fuzzy cryptography exploiting Bose–Chaudhuri–Hocquenghem (BCH) codes. We propose a quantization to derive secure keys for cross BCG-ECG device pairing from heart-rate variability and analyze the performance in (inter- and intra-subject) BCG-to-ECG pairing. A secure communication protocol for Body Area Networks (BAN) is discussed. The attack surface of the protocol is analyzed, and we conduct a video-based attack study. In addition, two case studies with 5 (laboratory) and 20 (controlled in-field) subjects were conducted.
first_indexed 2024-04-11T06:04:30Z
format Article
id doaj.art-a8f9d23115f64acf8d10d28b1e7ec662
institution Directory Open Access Journal
issn 2169-3536
language English
last_indexed 2024-04-11T06:04:30Z
publishDate 2022-01-01
publisher IEEE
record_format Article
series IEEE Access
spelling doaj.art-a8f9d23115f64acf8d10d28b1e7ec6622022-12-22T04:41:32ZengIEEEIEEE Access2169-35362022-01-011012868212869610.1109/ACCESS.2022.32265039969605CardioID: Secure ECG-BCG Agnostic Interaction-Free Device PairingSi Zuo0https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1418-8919Stephan Sigg1https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6118-3355Le Ngu Nguyen2Nils Beck3https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4373-953XNico Jahne-Raden4Marie Cathrine Wolf5Department of Communications and Networking, Aalto University, Espoo, FinlandDepartment of Communications and Networking, Aalto University, Espoo, FinlandFaculty of Information Technology and Electrical Engineering, University of Oulu, Oulu, FinlandInstitute for Natural Language Processing, University of Stuttgart, Stuttgart, GermanyPeter L. Reichertz Institute, Hannover, GermanyPeter L. Reichertz Institute, Hannover, GermanyUsably secure ad-hoc device pairing fosters connectivity with hardware which is difficult to access (e.g., implanted) and grants convenience for ad-hoc short-term on-off pairing patterns (e.g. shared public domain). Examples are medical devices or fitness equipment. We present CardioID, an approach to extract features from heart rate variability for secure pairing keys that change with the randomness inherited in heart operation. Our processing chain is compatible with electrocardiogram (ECG, voltage), as well as ballistocardiogram (BCG, acceleration) type signals. Dissimilarities in locally generated sequences are accounted for using fuzzy cryptography exploiting Bose–Chaudhuri–Hocquenghem (BCH) codes. We propose a quantization to derive secure keys for cross BCG-ECG device pairing from heart-rate variability and analyze the performance in (inter- and intra-subject) BCG-to-ECG pairing. A secure communication protocol for Body Area Networks (BAN) is discussed. The attack surface of the protocol is analyzed, and we conduct a video-based attack study. In addition, two case studies with 5 (laboratory) and 20 (controlled in-field) subjects were conducted.https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9969605/Ballistocardiogram (BCG)bioinformaticbody area networkdevices pairingelectrocardiogram (ECG)healthcare
spellingShingle Si Zuo
Stephan Sigg
Le Ngu Nguyen
Nils Beck
Nico Jahne-Raden
Marie Cathrine Wolf
CardioID: Secure ECG-BCG Agnostic Interaction-Free Device Pairing
IEEE Access
Ballistocardiogram (BCG)
bioinformatic
body area network
devices pairing
electrocardiogram (ECG)
healthcare
title CardioID: Secure ECG-BCG Agnostic Interaction-Free Device Pairing
title_full CardioID: Secure ECG-BCG Agnostic Interaction-Free Device Pairing
title_fullStr CardioID: Secure ECG-BCG Agnostic Interaction-Free Device Pairing
title_full_unstemmed CardioID: Secure ECG-BCG Agnostic Interaction-Free Device Pairing
title_short CardioID: Secure ECG-BCG Agnostic Interaction-Free Device Pairing
title_sort cardioid secure ecg bcg agnostic interaction free device pairing
topic Ballistocardiogram (BCG)
bioinformatic
body area network
devices pairing
electrocardiogram (ECG)
healthcare
url https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9969605/
work_keys_str_mv AT sizuo cardioidsecureecgbcgagnosticinteractionfreedevicepairing
AT stephansigg cardioidsecureecgbcgagnosticinteractionfreedevicepairing
AT lengunguyen cardioidsecureecgbcgagnosticinteractionfreedevicepairing
AT nilsbeck cardioidsecureecgbcgagnosticinteractionfreedevicepairing
AT nicojahneraden cardioidsecureecgbcgagnosticinteractionfreedevicepairing
AT mariecathrinewolf cardioidsecureecgbcgagnosticinteractionfreedevicepairing