Anscombe and the Unity of “Intention”
The conviction that ‘intention’ is not semantically ambiguous but has a single and distinctive meaning frames the argument of Anscombe’s masterwork Intention. What this meaning is, however, is barely recognizable in her book. One reason for this difficulty is that Intention starts from a threefold d...
Main Author: | Noam Melamed |
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Format: | Article |
Language: | Catalan |
Published: |
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona
2020-03-01
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Series: | Enrahonar: Quaderns de Filosofia |
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | https://revistes.uab.cat/enrahonar/article/view/1275 |
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