A Dilemma about the Mental
Physicalism demands an explication of what it means for something to be physical. But the most popular way of providing one—viz., characterizing the physical in terms of the postulates of a scientifically derived physical theory—is met with serious trouble. Proponents of physicalism can either appea...
Main Authors: | Guy Dove, Andreas Elpidorou |
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Format: | Article |
Language: | ces |
Published: |
Institute of Philosophy of the Slovak Academy of Sciences
2021-11-01
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Series: | Organon F |
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | https://www.sav.sk/journals/uploads/11292211orgf.2021.28406.pdf |
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