Resilient Design of Networked Control Systems Under Time Delay Switch Attacks, Application in Smart Grid
Industrial control systems are distributed hierarchical networks that share information via an assortment of communication protocols. Such systems are vulnerable to attacks that can cause disastrous consequences. This article focuses on time delay switch (TDS) attacks and shows that cryptographic so...
| Main Authors: | , , , , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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IEEE
2017-01-01
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| Series: | IEEE Access |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/7994606/ |
| _version_ | 1818876956511305728 |
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| author | Arman Sargolzaei Kang K. Yen Mohamed N. Abdelghani Saman Sargolzaei Bogdan Carbunar |
| author_facet | Arman Sargolzaei Kang K. Yen Mohamed N. Abdelghani Saman Sargolzaei Bogdan Carbunar |
| author_sort | Arman Sargolzaei |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | Industrial control systems are distributed hierarchical networks that share information via an assortment of communication protocols. Such systems are vulnerable to attacks that can cause disastrous consequences. This article focuses on time delay switch (TDS) attacks and shows that cryptographic solutions are ineffective in recovering from the denial of service component of TDS attacks. Therefore, a cryptography-free TDS recovery (CF-TDSR) communication protocol enhancement is developed that leverages adaptive channel redundancy techniques and a novel state estimator, to detect and recover from the destabilizing effects of TDS attacks. Simulation results are conducted to prove that CF-TDSR ensures the control stability of linear time invariant systems and to show the efficacy of CF-TDSR against attacks deployed on multi-area load frequency control components of a distributed power grid. |
| first_indexed | 2024-12-19T13:50:38Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-a927df30875d474ea11d61069495b6e1 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 2169-3536 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-12-19T13:50:38Z |
| publishDate | 2017-01-01 |
| publisher | IEEE |
| record_format | Article |
| series | IEEE Access |
| spelling | doaj.art-a927df30875d474ea11d61069495b6e12022-12-21T20:18:45ZengIEEEIEEE Access2169-35362017-01-015159011591210.1109/ACCESS.2017.27317807994606Resilient Design of Networked Control Systems Under Time Delay Switch Attacks, Application in Smart GridArman Sargolzaei0https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6047-1870Kang K. Yen1Mohamed N. Abdelghani2Saman Sargolzaei3Bogdan Carbunar4Department of Electrical Engineering, Florida Polytechnic University, Lakeland, FL, USADepartment of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Florida International University, Miami, FL, USADepartment of Mathematics and Statistics, University of Alberta, Edmonton, AB, CanadaDepartment of Neurosurgery, University of California Los Angeles, Los Angeles, CA, USASchool of Computing and Information Sciences, Florida International University, Miami, FL, USAIndustrial control systems are distributed hierarchical networks that share information via an assortment of communication protocols. Such systems are vulnerable to attacks that can cause disastrous consequences. This article focuses on time delay switch (TDS) attacks and shows that cryptographic solutions are ineffective in recovering from the denial of service component of TDS attacks. Therefore, a cryptography-free TDS recovery (CF-TDSR) communication protocol enhancement is developed that leverages adaptive channel redundancy techniques and a novel state estimator, to detect and recover from the destabilizing effects of TDS attacks. Simulation results are conducted to prove that CF-TDSR ensures the control stability of linear time invariant systems and to show the efficacy of CF-TDSR against attacks deployed on multi-area load frequency control components of a distributed power grid.https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/7994606/Power control systemstime-delay switch attackattacks/faults tolerant designsintrusion detectionadaptive communication channelcyber attack |
| spellingShingle | Arman Sargolzaei Kang K. Yen Mohamed N. Abdelghani Saman Sargolzaei Bogdan Carbunar Resilient Design of Networked Control Systems Under Time Delay Switch Attacks, Application in Smart Grid IEEE Access Power control systems time-delay switch attack attacks/faults tolerant designs intrusion detection adaptive communication channel cyber attack |
| title | Resilient Design of Networked Control Systems Under Time Delay Switch Attacks, Application in Smart Grid |
| title_full | Resilient Design of Networked Control Systems Under Time Delay Switch Attacks, Application in Smart Grid |
| title_fullStr | Resilient Design of Networked Control Systems Under Time Delay Switch Attacks, Application in Smart Grid |
| title_full_unstemmed | Resilient Design of Networked Control Systems Under Time Delay Switch Attacks, Application in Smart Grid |
| title_short | Resilient Design of Networked Control Systems Under Time Delay Switch Attacks, Application in Smart Grid |
| title_sort | resilient design of networked control systems under time delay switch attacks application in smart grid |
| topic | Power control systems time-delay switch attack attacks/faults tolerant designs intrusion detection adaptive communication channel cyber attack |
| url | https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/7994606/ |
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