Capital Mobility, Veto Players, and Redistribution in Latin America During the Left Turn
This article offers an explanation for the intensity of redistributive policies from Latin American leftist governments during the so-called ‘left turn’. It challenges the idea that the recent radical leftist governments are the product of region-specific characteristics. Based on theoretical models...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Brazilian Political Science Association
2019-05-01
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| Series: | Brazilian Political Science Review |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://brazilianpoliticalsciencereview.org/wp-content/plugins/xml-to-html/include/lens/index.php?xml=1981-3821-bpsr-13-1-e0005.xml&lang=en#content/contributor_reference_3 |
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| author | Fabiano Santos Acir Almeida Thiago Moreira da Silva |
| author_facet | Fabiano Santos Acir Almeida Thiago Moreira da Silva |
| author_sort | Fabiano Santos |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | This article offers an explanation for the intensity of redistributive policies from Latin American leftist governments during the so-called ‘left turn’. It challenges the idea that the recent radical leftist governments are the product of region-specific characteristics. Based on theoretical models that analyze the implications of inequality in democracies and the moderating effects of different economic and institutional structures, it argues instead that the left’s redistributive policies were more intense in countries where capital mobility is low and there was no pro-elite legislative veto player. To evaluate this explanation, we offer original evidence from time-series -cross-section regression models of social spending, based on data from thirteen Latin American countries over the years 2003 to 2015. The results show partial support for the explanation: there is strong evidence that social spending decreased with the ideological distance between the president and the pro-elite veto player, but only weak evidence that capital mobility attenuated this effect. |
| first_indexed | 2024-04-12T23:00:26Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-a98081b07a8140deaacb03a8611709e4 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 1981-3821 1981-3821 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-04-12T23:00:26Z |
| publishDate | 2019-05-01 |
| publisher | Brazilian Political Science Association |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Brazilian Political Science Review |
| spelling | doaj.art-a98081b07a8140deaacb03a8611709e42022-12-22T03:13:05ZengBrazilian Political Science AssociationBrazilian Political Science Review1981-38211981-38212019-05-0113110.1590/1981-382120190001000Capital Mobility, Veto Players, and Redistribution in Latin America During the Left TurnFabiano Santos 0Acir Almeida1Thiago Moreira da Silva 2Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada, Rio de Janeiro, BrazilUniversidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro, BrazilThis article offers an explanation for the intensity of redistributive policies from Latin American leftist governments during the so-called ‘left turn’. It challenges the idea that the recent radical leftist governments are the product of region-specific characteristics. Based on theoretical models that analyze the implications of inequality in democracies and the moderating effects of different economic and institutional structures, it argues instead that the left’s redistributive policies were more intense in countries where capital mobility is low and there was no pro-elite legislative veto player. To evaluate this explanation, we offer original evidence from time-series -cross-section regression models of social spending, based on data from thirteen Latin American countries over the years 2003 to 2015. The results show partial support for the explanation: there is strong evidence that social spending decreased with the ideological distance between the president and the pro-elite veto player, but only weak evidence that capital mobility attenuated this effect.https://brazilianpoliticalsciencereview.org/wp-content/plugins/xml-to-html/include/lens/index.php?xml=1981-3821-bpsr-13-1-e0005.xml&lang=en#content/contributor_reference_3capital mobilityLatin Americaleft turnredistributionsocial spendingveto player |
| spellingShingle | Fabiano Santos Acir Almeida Thiago Moreira da Silva Capital Mobility, Veto Players, and Redistribution in Latin America During the Left Turn Brazilian Political Science Review capital mobility Latin America left turn redistribution social spending veto player |
| title | Capital Mobility, Veto Players, and Redistribution in Latin America During the Left Turn |
| title_full | Capital Mobility, Veto Players, and Redistribution in Latin America During the Left Turn |
| title_fullStr | Capital Mobility, Veto Players, and Redistribution in Latin America During the Left Turn |
| title_full_unstemmed | Capital Mobility, Veto Players, and Redistribution in Latin America During the Left Turn |
| title_short | Capital Mobility, Veto Players, and Redistribution in Latin America During the Left Turn |
| title_sort | capital mobility veto players and redistribution in latin america during the left turn |
| topic | capital mobility Latin America left turn redistribution social spending veto player |
| url | https://brazilianpoliticalsciencereview.org/wp-content/plugins/xml-to-html/include/lens/index.php?xml=1981-3821-bpsr-13-1-e0005.xml&lang=en#content/contributor_reference_3 |
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