Liberal autonomy in a troubled context
Autonomy, understood as self-rule, is almost routinely accepted as one of the core liberal concepts. Still, a closer view reveals that both the status and meaning of autonomy are controversial. The text departs from a short summary of the main theoretical disputes surrounding the concept. A...
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | deu |
| Published: |
Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory, Belgrade
2017-01-01
|
| Series: | Filozofija i Društvo |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://www.doiserbia.nb.rs/img/doi/0353-5738/2017/0353-57381701090D.pdf |
| Summary: | Autonomy, understood as self-rule, is almost routinely accepted as one of the
core liberal concepts. Still, a closer view reveals that both the status and
meaning of autonomy are controversial. The text departs from a short summary
of the main theoretical disputes surrounding the concept. A critique of the
standard internalist account is followed by an attempt to offer reasons for
accepting a relational reading of autonomy. The central question of the text
is context-specific. It asks about the possibility and meaning of liberal
autonomy in a society whose past is marked by mass regime-sponsored (and
sometimes widely supported) crimes. The background assumption is that mass
crime leaves actors in heteronomous condition. At stake is reestablishing
individual autonomies of two types of actors, whose group-specific identities
have been created by crime: the ethical community of those who share
collective identity with victims, and the ethical community of those who
share collective identity with perpetrators. |
|---|---|
| ISSN: | 0353-5738 2334-8577 |