Can dispositionalism about belief vindicate doxasticism about delusion?

Clinical delusions have traditionally been characterized as beliefs in psychiatry. However, philosophers have recently engaged with the empirical literature and produced a number of objections to the so-called doxastic status of delusion, stemming mainly from the mismatch between the functional role...

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Main Author: José Eduardo Porcher
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina 2015-09-01
Series:Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology
Subjects:
Online Access:https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/35289
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author José Eduardo Porcher
author_facet José Eduardo Porcher
author_sort José Eduardo Porcher
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description Clinical delusions have traditionally been characterized as beliefs in psychiatry. However, philosophers have recently engaged with the empirical literature and produced a number of objections to the so-called doxastic status of delusion, stemming mainly from the mismatch between the functional role of delusions and that expected of beliefs. In response to this, an appeal to dispositionalism about the nature of belief has been proposed to vindicate the doxastic status of delusion. In this paper, I first present the objections to attributing beliefs to delusional patients and the application of dispositionalism in the attempt to vindicate doxasticism. I then assess this application and some responses to the objections to the doxastic characterization. Finally, I offer some conclusions about the limits of folk-psychological concepts in the characterization and explanation of complex psychological phenomena such as delusions.
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spelling doaj.art-aa76adc0ae34401991b573e2f187d67b2022-12-22T00:40:10ZengUniversidade Federal de Santa CatarinaPrincipia: An International Journal of Epistemology1414-42471808-17112015-09-0119310.5007/1808-1711.2015v19n3p37924946Can dispositionalism about belief vindicate doxasticism about delusion?José Eduardo Porcher0Post-Doctoral Fellow (PNPD/CAPES) Universidade Federal do Paraná BrasilClinical delusions have traditionally been characterized as beliefs in psychiatry. However, philosophers have recently engaged with the empirical literature and produced a number of objections to the so-called doxastic status of delusion, stemming mainly from the mismatch between the functional role of delusions and that expected of beliefs. In response to this, an appeal to dispositionalism about the nature of belief has been proposed to vindicate the doxastic status of delusion. In this paper, I first present the objections to attributing beliefs to delusional patients and the application of dispositionalism in the attempt to vindicate doxasticism. I then assess this application and some responses to the objections to the doxastic characterization. Finally, I offer some conclusions about the limits of folk-psychological concepts in the characterization and explanation of complex psychological phenomena such as delusions.https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/35289Delusionbelieffolk psychologydispositionalismdoxasticism.
spellingShingle José Eduardo Porcher
Can dispositionalism about belief vindicate doxasticism about delusion?
Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology
Delusion
belief
folk psychology
dispositionalism
doxasticism.
title Can dispositionalism about belief vindicate doxasticism about delusion?
title_full Can dispositionalism about belief vindicate doxasticism about delusion?
title_fullStr Can dispositionalism about belief vindicate doxasticism about delusion?
title_full_unstemmed Can dispositionalism about belief vindicate doxasticism about delusion?
title_short Can dispositionalism about belief vindicate doxasticism about delusion?
title_sort can dispositionalism about belief vindicate doxasticism about delusion
topic Delusion
belief
folk psychology
dispositionalism
doxasticism.
url https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/35289
work_keys_str_mv AT joseeduardoporcher candispositionalismaboutbeliefvindicatedoxasticismaboutdelusion