Can dispositionalism about belief vindicate doxasticism about delusion?
Clinical delusions have traditionally been characterized as beliefs in psychiatry. However, philosophers have recently engaged with the empirical literature and produced a number of objections to the so-called doxastic status of delusion, stemming mainly from the mismatch between the functional role...
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
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Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina
2015-09-01
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Series: | Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology |
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Online Access: | https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/35289 |
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author | José Eduardo Porcher |
author_facet | José Eduardo Porcher |
author_sort | José Eduardo Porcher |
collection | DOAJ |
description | Clinical delusions have traditionally been characterized as beliefs in psychiatry. However, philosophers have recently engaged with the empirical literature and produced a number of objections to the so-called doxastic status of delusion, stemming mainly from the mismatch between the functional role of delusions and that expected of beliefs. In response to this, an appeal to dispositionalism about the nature of belief has been proposed to vindicate the doxastic status of delusion. In this paper, I first present the objections to attributing beliefs to delusional patients and the application of dispositionalism in the attempt to vindicate doxasticism. I then assess this application and some responses to the objections to the doxastic characterization. Finally, I offer some conclusions about the limits of folk-psychological concepts in the characterization and explanation of complex psychological phenomena such as delusions. |
first_indexed | 2024-12-12T03:20:51Z |
format | Article |
id | doaj.art-aa76adc0ae34401991b573e2f187d67b |
institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
issn | 1414-4247 1808-1711 |
language | English |
last_indexed | 2024-12-12T03:20:51Z |
publishDate | 2015-09-01 |
publisher | Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina |
record_format | Article |
series | Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology |
spelling | doaj.art-aa76adc0ae34401991b573e2f187d67b2022-12-22T00:40:10ZengUniversidade Federal de Santa CatarinaPrincipia: An International Journal of Epistemology1414-42471808-17112015-09-0119310.5007/1808-1711.2015v19n3p37924946Can dispositionalism about belief vindicate doxasticism about delusion?José Eduardo Porcher0Post-Doctoral Fellow (PNPD/CAPES) Universidade Federal do Paraná BrasilClinical delusions have traditionally been characterized as beliefs in psychiatry. However, philosophers have recently engaged with the empirical literature and produced a number of objections to the so-called doxastic status of delusion, stemming mainly from the mismatch between the functional role of delusions and that expected of beliefs. In response to this, an appeal to dispositionalism about the nature of belief has been proposed to vindicate the doxastic status of delusion. In this paper, I first present the objections to attributing beliefs to delusional patients and the application of dispositionalism in the attempt to vindicate doxasticism. I then assess this application and some responses to the objections to the doxastic characterization. Finally, I offer some conclusions about the limits of folk-psychological concepts in the characterization and explanation of complex psychological phenomena such as delusions.https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/35289Delusionbelieffolk psychologydispositionalismdoxasticism. |
spellingShingle | José Eduardo Porcher Can dispositionalism about belief vindicate doxasticism about delusion? Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology Delusion belief folk psychology dispositionalism doxasticism. |
title | Can dispositionalism about belief vindicate doxasticism about delusion? |
title_full | Can dispositionalism about belief vindicate doxasticism about delusion? |
title_fullStr | Can dispositionalism about belief vindicate doxasticism about delusion? |
title_full_unstemmed | Can dispositionalism about belief vindicate doxasticism about delusion? |
title_short | Can dispositionalism about belief vindicate doxasticism about delusion? |
title_sort | can dispositionalism about belief vindicate doxasticism about delusion |
topic | Delusion belief folk psychology dispositionalism doxasticism. |
url | https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/35289 |
work_keys_str_mv | AT joseeduardoporcher candispositionalismaboutbeliefvindicatedoxasticismaboutdelusion |