Ambiguity aversion in a delay analogue of the Ellsberg Paradox

Decision makers are often ambiguity averse, preferring options with subjectively known probabilities to options with unknown probabilities. The Ellsberg paradox is the best-known example of this phenomenon. Ambiguity has generally been studied in the domain of risky choice, and many theories of ambi...

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Main Authors: Bethany J. Weber, Wah Pheow Tan
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Cambridge University Press 2012-07-01
Series:Judgment and Decision Making
Subjects:
Online Access:https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S1930297500002734/type/journal_article
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author Bethany J. Weber
Wah Pheow Tan
author_facet Bethany J. Weber
Wah Pheow Tan
author_sort Bethany J. Weber
collection DOAJ
description Decision makers are often ambiguity averse, preferring options with subjectively known probabilities to options with unknown probabilities. The Ellsberg paradox is the best-known example of this phenomenon. Ambiguity has generally been studied in the domain of risky choice, and many theories of ambiguity aversion deal with ambiguity only in this context. However, ambiguity aversion may occur in other contexts. In the present experiment, we examine the effects of ambiguity in intertemporal choice. Subjects imagine they are expecting a package and must choose between two delivery options. Some delivery times are exact. Others are ambiguous, with delivery possible over a range of dates. This problem was structurally identical to the Ellsberg paradox. Subjects showed the same pattern of responses as in the traditional Ellsberg paradox, with each delivery service preferred when it was the unambiguous option. Ambiguity aversion is not specific to risk, but can also occur in other domains.
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spelling doaj.art-aa9f1f9cf4494870b10e9369c5c3e92c2023-09-03T12:44:19ZengCambridge University PressJudgment and Decision Making1930-29752012-07-01738338910.1017/S1930297500002734Ambiguity aversion in a delay analogue of the Ellsberg ParadoxBethany J. Weber0Wah Pheow Tan1Department of Psychology, Iowa State University, W112 Lagomarcino Hall, Ames, IA 50011–3180School of Humanities and Social Sciences, Temasek PolytechnicDecision makers are often ambiguity averse, preferring options with subjectively known probabilities to options with unknown probabilities. The Ellsberg paradox is the best-known example of this phenomenon. Ambiguity has generally been studied in the domain of risky choice, and many theories of ambiguity aversion deal with ambiguity only in this context. However, ambiguity aversion may occur in other contexts. In the present experiment, we examine the effects of ambiguity in intertemporal choice. Subjects imagine they are expecting a package and must choose between two delivery options. Some delivery times are exact. Others are ambiguous, with delivery possible over a range of dates. This problem was structurally identical to the Ellsberg paradox. Subjects showed the same pattern of responses as in the traditional Ellsberg paradox, with each delivery service preferred when it was the unambiguous option. Ambiguity aversion is not specific to risk, but can also occur in other domains.https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S1930297500002734/type/journal_articleEllsberg paradoxdecision makingambiguityriskdelaychoice
spellingShingle Bethany J. Weber
Wah Pheow Tan
Ambiguity aversion in a delay analogue of the Ellsberg Paradox
Judgment and Decision Making
Ellsberg paradox
decision making
ambiguity
risk
delay
choice
title Ambiguity aversion in a delay analogue of the Ellsberg Paradox
title_full Ambiguity aversion in a delay analogue of the Ellsberg Paradox
title_fullStr Ambiguity aversion in a delay analogue of the Ellsberg Paradox
title_full_unstemmed Ambiguity aversion in a delay analogue of the Ellsberg Paradox
title_short Ambiguity aversion in a delay analogue of the Ellsberg Paradox
title_sort ambiguity aversion in a delay analogue of the ellsberg paradox
topic Ellsberg paradox
decision making
ambiguity
risk
delay
choice
url https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S1930297500002734/type/journal_article
work_keys_str_mv AT bethanyjweber ambiguityaversioninadelayanalogueoftheellsbergparadox
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