ICO vs. Equity Financing under Imperfect, Complex and Asymmetric Information

This paper offers a game-theoretic model of a firm that raises funds for financing an innovative business project and chooses between ICO (initial coin offering) and equity financing. The model is based on information problems associated with both ICO and equity financing well-documented in the lite...

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Main Author: Anton Miglo
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: MDPI AG 2023-12-01
Series:FinTech
Subjects:
Online Access:https://www.mdpi.com/2674-1032/3/1/2
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author Anton Miglo
author_facet Anton Miglo
author_sort Anton Miglo
collection DOAJ
description This paper offers a game-theoretic model of a firm that raises funds for financing an innovative business project and chooses between ICO (initial coin offering) and equity financing. The model is based on information problems associated with both ICO and equity financing well-documented in the literature. Several new features are introduced, for example, information complexity, which is analyzed along with a more traditional imperfect information and an asymmetric information approach. The model provides several implications that have not yet been tested. For example, we find that the message complexity can be beneficial for firms conducting ICOs. Also, high-quality projects can use ICO as a signal of quality. Thirdly, the average size of projects undertaking equity financing is larger than that of firms conducting ICO.
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spelling doaj.art-ac7ef554a571422b97d692d0277b84702024-03-27T13:38:05ZengMDPI AGFinTech2674-10322023-12-0131173910.3390/fintech3010002ICO vs. Equity Financing under Imperfect, Complex and Asymmetric InformationAnton Miglo0Adam Smith Business School, College of Social Science, University of Glasgow, Glasgow G128QQ, UKThis paper offers a game-theoretic model of a firm that raises funds for financing an innovative business project and chooses between ICO (initial coin offering) and equity financing. The model is based on information problems associated with both ICO and equity financing well-documented in the literature. Several new features are introduced, for example, information complexity, which is analyzed along with a more traditional imperfect information and an asymmetric information approach. The model provides several implications that have not yet been tested. For example, we find that the message complexity can be beneficial for firms conducting ICOs. Also, high-quality projects can use ICO as a signal of quality. Thirdly, the average size of projects undertaking equity financing is larger than that of firms conducting ICO.https://www.mdpi.com/2674-1032/3/1/2asymmetric informationcomplex informationinitial coin offering (ICO)equity financingsignaling
spellingShingle Anton Miglo
ICO vs. Equity Financing under Imperfect, Complex and Asymmetric Information
FinTech
asymmetric information
complex information
initial coin offering (ICO)
equity financing
signaling
title ICO vs. Equity Financing under Imperfect, Complex and Asymmetric Information
title_full ICO vs. Equity Financing under Imperfect, Complex and Asymmetric Information
title_fullStr ICO vs. Equity Financing under Imperfect, Complex and Asymmetric Information
title_full_unstemmed ICO vs. Equity Financing under Imperfect, Complex and Asymmetric Information
title_short ICO vs. Equity Financing under Imperfect, Complex and Asymmetric Information
title_sort ico vs equity financing under imperfect complex and asymmetric information
topic asymmetric information
complex information
initial coin offering (ICO)
equity financing
signaling
url https://www.mdpi.com/2674-1032/3/1/2
work_keys_str_mv AT antonmiglo icovsequityfinancingunderimperfectcomplexandasymmetricinformation