Free Will, Moral Responsibility, and Scientific Epiphenomenalism
This article addresses two influential lines of argument for what might be termed “scientific epiphenomenalism” about conscious intentions – the thesis that neither conscious intentions nor their physical correlates are among the causes of bodily motions – and links this thesis to skepticism about f...
Main Author: | Alfred R. Mele |
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Frontiers Media S.A.
2018-12-01
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Series: | Frontiers in Psychology |
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | https://www.frontiersin.org/article/10.3389/fpsyg.2018.02536/full |
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