Secret Key Generation Between Ambient Backscatter Devices
We analyze secret key generation between ambient backscatter devices where the channel between an ambient transmitter and the backscatter devices is used as a source of randomness. The devices do not need to estimate or measure the channel between themselves, which greatly simplifies the gathering o...
| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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IEEE
2023-01-01
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| Series: | IEEE Access |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/10040105/ |
| _version_ | 1811163528620408832 |
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| author | Jari Lietzen Olav Tirkkonen |
| author_facet | Jari Lietzen Olav Tirkkonen |
| author_sort | Jari Lietzen |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | We analyze secret key generation between ambient backscatter devices where the channel between an ambient transmitter and the backscatter devices is used as a source of randomness. The devices do not need to estimate or measure the channel between themselves, which greatly simplifies the gathering of raw key material. We analyze the eavesdropper’s mutual information based on fundamental principles and apply privacy amplification to remove any information that the eavesdropper overheard during the error correction phase. We show how the legitimate users can estimate the eavesdropper’s knowledge and trade off between achievable key rate and the eavesdropper’s knowledge of the final key. When modeling the channel between the ambient transmitter and the backscatter devices using state-of-the-art 3GPP channel models we show that even in non-line-of-sight channels the distance from legitimate users to an eavesdropper being larger than a few wavelengths is not alone a sufficient security guarantee. This is in contrast with previous secret key generation methods where distance is assumed to prevent the eavesdropper from having any information about the key prior to error correction. Our simulations show that a distance based approach is too optimistic and there is a possibility that the eavesdropper still knows a substantial part of the final key. |
| first_indexed | 2024-04-10T15:07:45Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-ad6cf14023dc49acae19204a16cdfd8d |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 2169-3536 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-04-10T15:07:45Z |
| publishDate | 2023-01-01 |
| publisher | IEEE |
| record_format | Article |
| series | IEEE Access |
| spelling | doaj.art-ad6cf14023dc49acae19204a16cdfd8d2023-02-15T00:00:49ZengIEEEIEEE Access2169-35362023-01-0111134561346810.1109/ACCESS.2023.324306310040105Secret Key Generation Between Ambient Backscatter DevicesJari Lietzen0https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7908-4547Olav Tirkkonen1https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2611-1636Department of Communications and Networking, Aalto University, Espoo, FinlandDepartment of Communications and Networking, Aalto University, Espoo, FinlandWe analyze secret key generation between ambient backscatter devices where the channel between an ambient transmitter and the backscatter devices is used as a source of randomness. The devices do not need to estimate or measure the channel between themselves, which greatly simplifies the gathering of raw key material. We analyze the eavesdropper’s mutual information based on fundamental principles and apply privacy amplification to remove any information that the eavesdropper overheard during the error correction phase. We show how the legitimate users can estimate the eavesdropper’s knowledge and trade off between achievable key rate and the eavesdropper’s knowledge of the final key. When modeling the channel between the ambient transmitter and the backscatter devices using state-of-the-art 3GPP channel models we show that even in non-line-of-sight channels the distance from legitimate users to an eavesdropper being larger than a few wavelengths is not alone a sufficient security guarantee. This is in contrast with previous secret key generation methods where distance is assumed to prevent the eavesdropper from having any information about the key prior to error correction. Our simulations show that a distance based approach is too optimistic and there is a possibility that the eavesdropper still knows a substantial part of the final key.https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/10040105/Secret key generationphysical layer securityambient backscatter communication |
| spellingShingle | Jari Lietzen Olav Tirkkonen Secret Key Generation Between Ambient Backscatter Devices IEEE Access Secret key generation physical layer security ambient backscatter communication |
| title | Secret Key Generation Between Ambient Backscatter Devices |
| title_full | Secret Key Generation Between Ambient Backscatter Devices |
| title_fullStr | Secret Key Generation Between Ambient Backscatter Devices |
| title_full_unstemmed | Secret Key Generation Between Ambient Backscatter Devices |
| title_short | Secret Key Generation Between Ambient Backscatter Devices |
| title_sort | secret key generation between ambient backscatter devices |
| topic | Secret key generation physical layer security ambient backscatter communication |
| url | https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/10040105/ |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT jarilietzen secretkeygenerationbetweenambientbackscatterdevices AT olavtirkkonen secretkeygenerationbetweenambientbackscatterdevices |