Instability of Mixed Nash Equilibria in Generalised Hawk-Dove Game: A Project Conflict Management Scenario
This paper generalises the Hawk-Dove evolutionary game by introducing cost sharing ratios for both players, and applies the generalised Hawk-Dove model to conflict management in projects through investigating the stability of Nash equilibria. A model with clashing interests between a project owner a...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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MDPI AG
2017-10-01
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| Series: | Games |
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| Online Access: | https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/8/4/42 |
| _version_ | 1819159976134836224 |
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| author | Sheryl Le Chang Mikhail Prokopenko |
| author_facet | Sheryl Le Chang Mikhail Prokopenko |
| author_sort | Sheryl Le Chang |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | This paper generalises the Hawk-Dove evolutionary game by introducing cost sharing ratios for both players, and applies the generalised Hawk-Dove model to conflict management in projects through investigating the stability of Nash equilibria. A model with clashing interests between a project owner and a contractor is considered to derive their strategy adaptation given the cost sharing ratios. As expected, the pure Nash equilibria are shown to be dominantly stable while the mixed strategy equilibrium is observed to be unstable, across the range of considered cost sharing ratios. In addition, simulations are conducted on the strategy adaptation and stability of the equilibria under noisy and latent conditions. The obtained results can be used by project managers in optimising their strategy in practice. |
| first_indexed | 2024-12-22T16:49:06Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-ae76fd42138e4af7b37c61424213dd9d |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 2073-4336 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-12-22T16:49:06Z |
| publishDate | 2017-10-01 |
| publisher | MDPI AG |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Games |
| spelling | doaj.art-ae76fd42138e4af7b37c61424213dd9d2022-12-21T18:19:39ZengMDPI AGGames2073-43362017-10-01844210.3390/g8040042g8040042Instability of Mixed Nash Equilibria in Generalised Hawk-Dove Game: A Project Conflict Management ScenarioSheryl Le Chang0Mikhail Prokopenko1Complex Systems Research Group, Faculty of Engineering and IT, University of Sydney, NSW 2006, AustraliaComplex Systems Research Group, Faculty of Engineering and IT, University of Sydney, NSW 2006, AustraliaThis paper generalises the Hawk-Dove evolutionary game by introducing cost sharing ratios for both players, and applies the generalised Hawk-Dove model to conflict management in projects through investigating the stability of Nash equilibria. A model with clashing interests between a project owner and a contractor is considered to derive their strategy adaptation given the cost sharing ratios. As expected, the pure Nash equilibria are shown to be dominantly stable while the mixed strategy equilibrium is observed to be unstable, across the range of considered cost sharing ratios. In addition, simulations are conducted on the strategy adaptation and stability of the equilibria under noisy and latent conditions. The obtained results can be used by project managers in optimising their strategy in practice.https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/8/4/42evolutionary game theoryproject conflict managementNash equilibriumHawk-Dove game |
| spellingShingle | Sheryl Le Chang Mikhail Prokopenko Instability of Mixed Nash Equilibria in Generalised Hawk-Dove Game: A Project Conflict Management Scenario Games evolutionary game theory project conflict management Nash equilibrium Hawk-Dove game |
| title | Instability of Mixed Nash Equilibria in Generalised Hawk-Dove Game: A Project Conflict Management Scenario |
| title_full | Instability of Mixed Nash Equilibria in Generalised Hawk-Dove Game: A Project Conflict Management Scenario |
| title_fullStr | Instability of Mixed Nash Equilibria in Generalised Hawk-Dove Game: A Project Conflict Management Scenario |
| title_full_unstemmed | Instability of Mixed Nash Equilibria in Generalised Hawk-Dove Game: A Project Conflict Management Scenario |
| title_short | Instability of Mixed Nash Equilibria in Generalised Hawk-Dove Game: A Project Conflict Management Scenario |
| title_sort | instability of mixed nash equilibria in generalised hawk dove game a project conflict management scenario |
| topic | evolutionary game theory project conflict management Nash equilibrium Hawk-Dove game |
| url | https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/8/4/42 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT sheryllechang instabilityofmixednashequilibriaingeneralisedhawkdovegameaprojectconflictmanagementscenario AT mikhailprokopenko instabilityofmixednashequilibriaingeneralisedhawkdovegameaprojectconflictmanagementscenario |