Instability of Mixed Nash Equilibria in Generalised Hawk-Dove Game: A Project Conflict Management Scenario
This paper generalises the Hawk-Dove evolutionary game by introducing cost sharing ratios for both players, and applies the generalised Hawk-Dove model to conflict management in projects through investigating the stability of Nash equilibria. A model with clashing interests between a project owner a...
Main Authors: | Sheryl Le Chang, Mikhail Prokopenko |
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
MDPI AG
2017-10-01
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Series: | Games |
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/8/4/42 |
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