The EU institutional model of competition law enforcement evisited: How much rule of law suffices?
The EU model of competition law enforcement has been criticized by many authors ever since antitrust provisions in the EEC Treaty became effective. The fundamental contradiction between the high level of fines threatened (and often imposed) for antitrust violations and the administrative, inquisitor...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Union University, Faculty of Law, Belgrade
2022-01-01
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| Series: | Pravni Zapisi |
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| Online Access: | https://scindeks-clanci.ceon.rs/data/pdf/2217-2815/2022/2217-28152202500M.pdf |
| _version_ | 1797938552822038528 |
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| author | Marković-Bajalović Dijana |
| author_facet | Marković-Bajalović Dijana |
| author_sort | Marković-Bajalović Dijana |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | The EU model of competition law enforcement has been criticized by many authors ever since antitrust provisions in the EEC Treaty became effective. The fundamental contradiction between the high level of fines threatened (and often imposed) for antitrust violations and the administrative, inquisitorial procedure for investigating antitrust offences and imposing sanctions has principally inspired the critics. The compatibility of the EU model with Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (the ECHR) was disputed, instigating the EU institutions to take steps to improve the institutional and procedural framework for applying competition rules. This process has not been completed yet. Directive 2019/1 raised additional controversies regarding the compliance of variegated national enforcement models with the rule of law. This article aims to analyze the genesis of the competition enforcement model in the EU, which materialized mainly through the EU secondary legislation and ECJ case law. We evaluate the EU model against the enforcement system imagined by the Ordoliberal school of thought and, secondly, against administrative models existing in two "old" Member States, in which the rule of law has deeply rooted - France and Germany. We conclude by identifying the most cumbersome deficiencies of the EU model and proposing possible solutions for eliminating them. |
| first_indexed | 2024-04-10T19:02:38Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-aebf2db5e2634c65866c7df0f9bd7952 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 2217-2815 2406-1387 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-04-10T19:02:38Z |
| publishDate | 2022-01-01 |
| publisher | Union University, Faculty of Law, Belgrade |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Pravni Zapisi |
| spelling | doaj.art-aebf2db5e2634c65866c7df0f9bd79522023-01-31T08:22:39ZengUnion University, Faculty of Law, BelgradePravni Zapisi2217-28152406-13872022-01-0113250053510.5937/pravzap0-400752217-28152202500MThe EU institutional model of competition law enforcement evisited: How much rule of law suffices?Marković-Bajalović Dijana0https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6887-1310Union University, Law School, Belgrade, SerbiaThe EU model of competition law enforcement has been criticized by many authors ever since antitrust provisions in the EEC Treaty became effective. The fundamental contradiction between the high level of fines threatened (and often imposed) for antitrust violations and the administrative, inquisitorial procedure for investigating antitrust offences and imposing sanctions has principally inspired the critics. The compatibility of the EU model with Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (the ECHR) was disputed, instigating the EU institutions to take steps to improve the institutional and procedural framework for applying competition rules. This process has not been completed yet. Directive 2019/1 raised additional controversies regarding the compliance of variegated national enforcement models with the rule of law. This article aims to analyze the genesis of the competition enforcement model in the EU, which materialized mainly through the EU secondary legislation and ECJ case law. We evaluate the EU model against the enforcement system imagined by the Ordoliberal school of thought and, secondly, against administrative models existing in two "old" Member States, in which the rule of law has deeply rooted - France and Germany. We conclude by identifying the most cumbersome deficiencies of the EU model and proposing possible solutions for eliminating them.https://scindeks-clanci.ceon.rs/data/pdf/2217-2815/2022/2217-28152202500M.pdfcompetition lawadministrative enforcementordoliberal school of thoughtthe rule of lawarticle 6 of echrdirective 2019/1menarini decision |
| spellingShingle | Marković-Bajalović Dijana The EU institutional model of competition law enforcement evisited: How much rule of law suffices? Pravni Zapisi competition law administrative enforcement ordoliberal school of thought the rule of law article 6 of echr directive 2019/1 menarini decision |
| title | The EU institutional model of competition law enforcement evisited: How much rule of law suffices? |
| title_full | The EU institutional model of competition law enforcement evisited: How much rule of law suffices? |
| title_fullStr | The EU institutional model of competition law enforcement evisited: How much rule of law suffices? |
| title_full_unstemmed | The EU institutional model of competition law enforcement evisited: How much rule of law suffices? |
| title_short | The EU institutional model of competition law enforcement evisited: How much rule of law suffices? |
| title_sort | eu institutional model of competition law enforcement evisited how much rule of law suffices |
| topic | competition law administrative enforcement ordoliberal school of thought the rule of law article 6 of echr directive 2019/1 menarini decision |
| url | https://scindeks-clanci.ceon.rs/data/pdf/2217-2815/2022/2217-28152202500M.pdf |
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