Determinism, "Ought" Implies "Can" and Moral Obligation
Haji argues that determinism threatens deontic morality, not via a threat to moral responsibility, but directly, because of the principle that "ought" implies "can". Haji's argument requires not only that we embrace an "ought" implies "can" principle, bu...
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Format: | Article |
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Philosophie.ch
2020-04-01
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Series: | Dialectica |
Online Access: | https://dialectica.philosophie.ch/dialectica/article/view/4 |
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author | Nadine Elzein |
author_facet | Nadine Elzein |
author_sort | Nadine Elzein |
collection | DOAJ |
description |
Haji argues that determinism threatens deontic morality, not via a
threat to moral responsibility, but directly, because of the principle
that "ought" implies "can". Haji's argument requires not only that we
embrace an "ought" implies "can" principle, but also that we adopt the
principle that "ought" implies "able not to". I argue that we have
little reason to adopt the latter principle, and examine whether deontic
morality might be destroyed on the basis of the more commonly embraced
"ought" implies "can" principle alone. I argue that despite what look
like initially compelling reasons why we might suppose that this weaker
conclusion is similarly destructive to deontic morality, we actually
have good reason to doubt that it has any practical relevance for moral
deliberation at all.
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first_indexed | 2024-04-09T19:19:19Z |
format | Article |
id | doaj.art-aed89357430f4a699709536576aa4f4a |
institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
issn | 0012-2017 1746-8361 |
language | English |
last_indexed | 2024-04-09T19:19:19Z |
publishDate | 2020-04-01 |
publisher | Philosophie.ch |
record_format | Article |
series | Dialectica |
spelling | doaj.art-aed89357430f4a699709536576aa4f4a2023-04-05T15:30:20ZengPhilosophie.chDialectica0012-20171746-83612020-04-0174110.48106/dial.v74.i1.03Determinism, "Ought" Implies "Can" and Moral ObligationNadine Elzein Haji argues that determinism threatens deontic morality, not via a threat to moral responsibility, but directly, because of the principle that "ought" implies "can". Haji's argument requires not only that we embrace an "ought" implies "can" principle, but also that we adopt the principle that "ought" implies "able not to". I argue that we have little reason to adopt the latter principle, and examine whether deontic morality might be destroyed on the basis of the more commonly embraced "ought" implies "can" principle alone. I argue that despite what look like initially compelling reasons why we might suppose that this weaker conclusion is similarly destructive to deontic morality, we actually have good reason to doubt that it has any practical relevance for moral deliberation at all. https://dialectica.philosophie.ch/dialectica/article/view/4 |
spellingShingle | Nadine Elzein Determinism, "Ought" Implies "Can" and Moral Obligation Dialectica |
title | Determinism, "Ought" Implies "Can" and Moral Obligation |
title_full | Determinism, "Ought" Implies "Can" and Moral Obligation |
title_fullStr | Determinism, "Ought" Implies "Can" and Moral Obligation |
title_full_unstemmed | Determinism, "Ought" Implies "Can" and Moral Obligation |
title_short | Determinism, "Ought" Implies "Can" and Moral Obligation |
title_sort | determinism ought implies can and moral obligation |
url | https://dialectica.philosophie.ch/dialectica/article/view/4 |
work_keys_str_mv | AT nadineelzein determinismoughtimpliescanandmoralobligation |