Possible Dilemmas Raised by Impossible Moral Requirements
The priority that Tessman’s argument gives to phenomenological and neuropsychological explanations of moral requirements entails a fundamental shift in our understanding of these. Two central problems of normative theory come together in Tessman’s account. The first arises when an agent’s sense of r...
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
University of Western Ontario
2016-07-01
|
| Series: | Feminist Philosophy Quarterly |
| Online Access: | https://ojs.lib.uwo.ca/index.php/fpq/article/view/3020 |
| _version_ | 1798027679372410880 |
|---|---|
| author | Lisa Rivera |
| author_facet | Lisa Rivera |
| author_sort | Lisa Rivera |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | The priority that Tessman’s argument gives to phenomenological and neuropsychological explanations of moral requirements entails a fundamental shift in our understanding of these. Two central problems of normative theory come together in Tessman’s account. The first arises when an agent’s sense of requirement clashes with what a systematic theory prescribes. The second arises when neuropsychological accounts fail to fit the prescription. Tessman argues that no account successfully resolves moral dilemmas such that ought always implies can, and she argues that neuropsychology explains our sense of impossible requirements. This explanation eliminates the role of a prescriptive theory in explaining an agent’s sense of requirement. |
| first_indexed | 2024-04-11T18:55:33Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-b01bfbca445b4892949643f1d2afe15b |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 2371-2570 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-04-11T18:55:33Z |
| publishDate | 2016-07-01 |
| publisher | University of Western Ontario |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Feminist Philosophy Quarterly |
| spelling | doaj.art-b01bfbca445b4892949643f1d2afe15b2022-12-22T04:08:12ZengUniversity of Western OntarioFeminist Philosophy Quarterly2371-25702016-07-012110.5206/fpq/2016.1.5Possible Dilemmas Raised by Impossible Moral RequirementsLisa Rivera0University of Massachusetts BostonThe priority that Tessman’s argument gives to phenomenological and neuropsychological explanations of moral requirements entails a fundamental shift in our understanding of these. Two central problems of normative theory come together in Tessman’s account. The first arises when an agent’s sense of requirement clashes with what a systematic theory prescribes. The second arises when neuropsychological accounts fail to fit the prescription. Tessman argues that no account successfully resolves moral dilemmas such that ought always implies can, and she argues that neuropsychology explains our sense of impossible requirements. This explanation eliminates the role of a prescriptive theory in explaining an agent’s sense of requirement.https://ojs.lib.uwo.ca/index.php/fpq/article/view/3020 |
| spellingShingle | Lisa Rivera Possible Dilemmas Raised by Impossible Moral Requirements Feminist Philosophy Quarterly |
| title | Possible Dilemmas Raised by Impossible Moral Requirements |
| title_full | Possible Dilemmas Raised by Impossible Moral Requirements |
| title_fullStr | Possible Dilemmas Raised by Impossible Moral Requirements |
| title_full_unstemmed | Possible Dilemmas Raised by Impossible Moral Requirements |
| title_short | Possible Dilemmas Raised by Impossible Moral Requirements |
| title_sort | possible dilemmas raised by impossible moral requirements |
| url | https://ojs.lib.uwo.ca/index.php/fpq/article/view/3020 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT lisarivera possibledilemmasraisedbyimpossiblemoralrequirements |