Punishing the privileged: Selfish offers from high-status allocators elicit greater punishment from third-party arbitrators.
Individuals high in socioeconomic status (SES) are often viewed as valuable members of society. However, the appeal of high-SES people exists in tension with our aversion to inequity. Little experimental work has directly examined how people rectify inequitable distributions between two individuals...
| Main Authors: | , , , , , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Public Library of Science (PLoS)
2020-01-01
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| Series: | PLoS ONE |
| Online Access: | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0232369 |
| _version_ | 1829502204236529664 |
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| author | Bradley D Mattan Denise M Barth Alexandra Thompson Oriel FeldmanHall Jasmin Cloutier Jennifer T Kubota |
| author_facet | Bradley D Mattan Denise M Barth Alexandra Thompson Oriel FeldmanHall Jasmin Cloutier Jennifer T Kubota |
| author_sort | Bradley D Mattan |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | Individuals high in socioeconomic status (SES) are often viewed as valuable members of society. However, the appeal of high-SES people exists in tension with our aversion to inequity. Little experimental work has directly examined how people rectify inequitable distributions between two individuals varying in SES. The objective of the present study was to examine how disinterested third parties adjudicate inequity in the context of concrete financial allocations between a selfish allocator and a recipient who was the victim of the allocator's selfish offer. Specifically, this study focused on whether knowing the SES of the victim or the allocator affected the participant's decisions to punish the selfish allocator. In two experiments (N = 999), participants completed a modified third-party Ultimatum Game in which they arbitrated inequitable exchanges between an allocator and a recipient. Although participants generally preferred to redistribute inequitable exchanges without punishing players who made unfair allocations, we observed an increased preference for punitive solutions as offers became increasingly selfish. This tendency was especially pronounced when the victim was low in SES or when the perpetrator was high in SES, suggesting a tendency to favor the disadvantaged even among participants reporting high subjective SES. Finally, punitive responses were especially likely when the context emphasized the allocator's privileged status rather than the recipient's underprivileged status. These findings inform our understanding of how SES biases retributive justice even in non-judicial contexts that minimize the salience of punishment. |
| first_indexed | 2024-12-16T09:32:41Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-b0cfa4c2950144d4b720d2216dd3fda2 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 1932-6203 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-12-16T09:32:41Z |
| publishDate | 2020-01-01 |
| publisher | Public Library of Science (PLoS) |
| record_format | Article |
| series | PLoS ONE |
| spelling | doaj.art-b0cfa4c2950144d4b720d2216dd3fda22022-12-21T22:36:29ZengPublic Library of Science (PLoS)PLoS ONE1932-62032020-01-01155e023236910.1371/journal.pone.0232369Punishing the privileged: Selfish offers from high-status allocators elicit greater punishment from third-party arbitrators.Bradley D MattanDenise M BarthAlexandra ThompsonOriel FeldmanHallJasmin CloutierJennifer T KubotaIndividuals high in socioeconomic status (SES) are often viewed as valuable members of society. However, the appeal of high-SES people exists in tension with our aversion to inequity. Little experimental work has directly examined how people rectify inequitable distributions between two individuals varying in SES. The objective of the present study was to examine how disinterested third parties adjudicate inequity in the context of concrete financial allocations between a selfish allocator and a recipient who was the victim of the allocator's selfish offer. Specifically, this study focused on whether knowing the SES of the victim or the allocator affected the participant's decisions to punish the selfish allocator. In two experiments (N = 999), participants completed a modified third-party Ultimatum Game in which they arbitrated inequitable exchanges between an allocator and a recipient. Although participants generally preferred to redistribute inequitable exchanges without punishing players who made unfair allocations, we observed an increased preference for punitive solutions as offers became increasingly selfish. This tendency was especially pronounced when the victim was low in SES or when the perpetrator was high in SES, suggesting a tendency to favor the disadvantaged even among participants reporting high subjective SES. Finally, punitive responses were especially likely when the context emphasized the allocator's privileged status rather than the recipient's underprivileged status. These findings inform our understanding of how SES biases retributive justice even in non-judicial contexts that minimize the salience of punishment.https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0232369 |
| spellingShingle | Bradley D Mattan Denise M Barth Alexandra Thompson Oriel FeldmanHall Jasmin Cloutier Jennifer T Kubota Punishing the privileged: Selfish offers from high-status allocators elicit greater punishment from third-party arbitrators. PLoS ONE |
| title | Punishing the privileged: Selfish offers from high-status allocators elicit greater punishment from third-party arbitrators. |
| title_full | Punishing the privileged: Selfish offers from high-status allocators elicit greater punishment from third-party arbitrators. |
| title_fullStr | Punishing the privileged: Selfish offers from high-status allocators elicit greater punishment from third-party arbitrators. |
| title_full_unstemmed | Punishing the privileged: Selfish offers from high-status allocators elicit greater punishment from third-party arbitrators. |
| title_short | Punishing the privileged: Selfish offers from high-status allocators elicit greater punishment from third-party arbitrators. |
| title_sort | punishing the privileged selfish offers from high status allocators elicit greater punishment from third party arbitrators |
| url | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0232369 |
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