Multilateral Organization vs. Bilateral Negotiations: A Case of the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs)

In the 1990s, the issue of intellectual property rights (IPR) protection gained a prominent place on the international trade agenda, which led to the establishment of the trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights (TRIPs) as a part of the WTO regime. Two questions are asked regarding this...

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Main Author: Namhoon Kwon
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Korea Institute for International Economic Policy 2001-12-01
Series:East Asian Economic Review
Subjects:
Online Access:http://dx.doi.org/10.11644/KIEP.JEAI.2001.5.2.86
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author Namhoon Kwon
author_facet Namhoon Kwon
author_sort Namhoon Kwon
collection DOAJ
description In the 1990s, the issue of intellectual property rights (IPR) protection gained a prominent place on the international trade agenda, which led to the establishment of the trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights (TRIPs) as a part of the WTO regime. Two questions are asked regarding this development: whether a multilateral organization such as the WTO performs better than bilateral negotiations in resolving IPR disputes, and what happened around the 1990s to create an environment favorable to the establishment of a multilateral organization. To deal with these issues, this paper takes the IPE (international political economy) approach. Using a very simple game theory model, I derive the cases in which a multilateral organization has better performances. Then, it is used to show that political pressures due to the growth of the US trade deficit in the late 1980s could have been the reason that a multilateral organization became the institutional equilibrium.
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spelling doaj.art-b20ec4ae816a47c8aa9250c600491d2f2022-12-21T20:34:14ZengKorea Institute for International Economic PolicyEast Asian Economic Review2508-16402508-16672001-12-0152167193http://dx.doi.org/10.11644/KIEP.JEAI.2001.5.2.86Multilateral Organization vs. Bilateral Negotiations: A Case of the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs)Namhoon Kwon 0Korea Information Society Development InstituteIn the 1990s, the issue of intellectual property rights (IPR) protection gained a prominent place on the international trade agenda, which led to the establishment of the trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights (TRIPs) as a part of the WTO regime. Two questions are asked regarding this development: whether a multilateral organization such as the WTO performs better than bilateral negotiations in resolving IPR disputes, and what happened around the 1990s to create an environment favorable to the establishment of a multilateral organization. To deal with these issues, this paper takes the IPE (international political economy) approach. Using a very simple game theory model, I derive the cases in which a multilateral organization has better performances. Then, it is used to show that political pressures due to the growth of the US trade deficit in the late 1980s could have been the reason that a multilateral organization became the institutional equilibrium.http://dx.doi.org/10.11644/KIEP.JEAI.2001.5.2.86WTOTRIPBilateral NegotiationsMultilateral Organization
spellingShingle Namhoon Kwon
Multilateral Organization vs. Bilateral Negotiations: A Case of the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs)
East Asian Economic Review
WTO
TRIP
Bilateral Negotiations
Multilateral Organization
title Multilateral Organization vs. Bilateral Negotiations: A Case of the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs)
title_full Multilateral Organization vs. Bilateral Negotiations: A Case of the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs)
title_fullStr Multilateral Organization vs. Bilateral Negotiations: A Case of the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs)
title_full_unstemmed Multilateral Organization vs. Bilateral Negotiations: A Case of the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs)
title_short Multilateral Organization vs. Bilateral Negotiations: A Case of the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs)
title_sort multilateral organization vs bilateral negotiations a case of the trade related aspects of intellectual property rights trips
topic WTO
TRIP
Bilateral Negotiations
Multilateral Organization
url http://dx.doi.org/10.11644/KIEP.JEAI.2001.5.2.86
work_keys_str_mv AT namhoonkwon multilateralorganizationvsbilateralnegotiationsacaseofthetraderelatedaspectsofintellectualpropertyrightstrips