Strategies for avoiding asymmetric information in construction project management
A construction project is characterized by a high number of project participants and a multitude of contract relations. The Principal Agent Theory deals with the design of contracts, especially with respect to asymmetric information. Asymmetric distribution of information in co‐operations can have e...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Vilnius Gediminas Technical University
2008-03-01
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| Series: | Journal of Business Economics and Management |
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| Online Access: | https://journals.vgtu.lt/index.php/JBEM/article/view/6841 |
| _version_ | 1818913912499732480 |
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| author | Martin Schieg |
| author_facet | Martin Schieg |
| author_sort | Martin Schieg |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | A construction project is characterized by a high number of project participants and a multitude of contract relations. The Principal Agent Theory deals with the design of contracts, especially with respect to asymmetric information. Asymmetric distribution of information in co‐operations can have effects before as well as after closing a contract. In construction project management therefore attention has to be paid to where information imbalances occur. Several methods are known with which one can cope with the resulting problems but which in turn cause costs.
First published online: 14 Oct 2010 |
| first_indexed | 2024-12-19T23:38:02Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-b2f0a9ea9c79402a92da68a997c87230 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 1611-1699 2029-4433 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-12-19T23:38:02Z |
| publishDate | 2008-03-01 |
| publisher | Vilnius Gediminas Technical University |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Journal of Business Economics and Management |
| spelling | doaj.art-b2f0a9ea9c79402a92da68a997c872302022-12-21T20:01:32ZengVilnius Gediminas Technical UniversityJournal of Business Economics and Management1611-16992029-44332008-03-019110.3846/1611-1699.2008.9.47-51Strategies for avoiding asymmetric information in construction project managementMartin Schieg0Technical University of Munich, Arcisstraße 21, 80333 Munich, GermanyA construction project is characterized by a high number of project participants and a multitude of contract relations. The Principal Agent Theory deals with the design of contracts, especially with respect to asymmetric information. Asymmetric distribution of information in co‐operations can have effects before as well as after closing a contract. In construction project management therefore attention has to be paid to where information imbalances occur. Several methods are known with which one can cope with the resulting problems but which in turn cause costs. First published online: 14 Oct 2010https://journals.vgtu.lt/index.php/JBEM/article/view/6841Principal Agent Theoryasymmetric informationAdverse SelectionMoral HazardHold-upAgency Costs |
| spellingShingle | Martin Schieg Strategies for avoiding asymmetric information in construction project management Journal of Business Economics and Management Principal Agent Theory asymmetric information Adverse Selection Moral Hazard Hold-up Agency Costs |
| title | Strategies for avoiding asymmetric information in construction project management |
| title_full | Strategies for avoiding asymmetric information in construction project management |
| title_fullStr | Strategies for avoiding asymmetric information in construction project management |
| title_full_unstemmed | Strategies for avoiding asymmetric information in construction project management |
| title_short | Strategies for avoiding asymmetric information in construction project management |
| title_sort | strategies for avoiding asymmetric information in construction project management |
| topic | Principal Agent Theory asymmetric information Adverse Selection Moral Hazard Hold-up Agency Costs |
| url | https://journals.vgtu.lt/index.php/JBEM/article/view/6841 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT martinschieg strategiesforavoidingasymmetricinformationinconstructionprojectmanagement |