Strategies for avoiding asymmetric information in construction project management

Strategies for avoiding asymmetric information in construction project management

A construction project is characterized by a high number of project participants and a multitude of contract relations. The Principal Agent Theory deals with the design of contracts, especially with respect to asymmetric information. Asymmetric distribution of information in co‐operations can have e...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Martin Schieg
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Vilnius Gediminas Technical University 2008-03-01
Series:Journal of Business Economics and Management
Subjects:
Principal Agent Theory
asymmetric information
Adverse Selection
Moral Hazard
Hold-up
Agency Costs
Online Access:https://journals.vgtu.lt/index.php/JBEM/article/view/6841

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