Incentive Mechanisms Surrounding International Financial Institutions

This paper applies the common agency framework and the theory of nonprofit organization to the functioning of international financial institutions (IFIs such as the IMF, IBRD, and ADB. Webs of intricate monitoring networks exist among member countries of an institution, its secretariat, and countrie...

Full description

Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Koichi Hamada
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: World Scientific Publishing 1998-01-01
Series:Asian Development Review
Online Access:https://www.worldscientific.com/doi/10.1142/S0116110598000049
_version_ 1797793891674488832
author Koichi Hamada
author_facet Koichi Hamada
author_sort Koichi Hamada
collection DOAJ
description This paper applies the common agency framework and the theory of nonprofit organization to the functioning of international financial institutions (IFIs such as the IMF, IBRD, and ADB. Webs of intricate monitoring networks exist among member countries of an institution, its secretariat, and countries that receive financial support in exchange for conditionality. The paper will show, under the assumption of risk averse institutions and risk neutral members, that (i) the power of monitoring will be normally weakened if the IFI has an independent objective distinct from that of members; (ii) two or more IFIs will help the members unless external diseconomies exist among them; (iii) the free-rider problem of public goods can be resolved by conditionality but under a strict condition of perfect appropriability of surplus by principals, and (iv) if the IFI is situated between two risk neutral members like donor countries and recipient countries of IFI support, then the weakening of the power of monitoring disappears.
first_indexed 2024-03-13T02:54:48Z
format Article
id doaj.art-b2fa097c55b34e7797c64ad1976fa0d1
institution Directory Open Access Journal
issn 0116-1105
1996-7241
language English
last_indexed 2024-03-13T02:54:48Z
publishDate 1998-01-01
publisher World Scientific Publishing
record_format Article
series Asian Development Review
spelling doaj.art-b2fa097c55b34e7797c64ad1976fa0d12023-06-28T07:13:31ZengWorld Scientific PublishingAsian Development Review0116-11051996-72411998-01-01160112614810.1142/S0116110598000049Incentive Mechanisms Surrounding International Financial InstitutionsKoichi HamadaThis paper applies the common agency framework and the theory of nonprofit organization to the functioning of international financial institutions (IFIs such as the IMF, IBRD, and ADB. Webs of intricate monitoring networks exist among member countries of an institution, its secretariat, and countries that receive financial support in exchange for conditionality. The paper will show, under the assumption of risk averse institutions and risk neutral members, that (i) the power of monitoring will be normally weakened if the IFI has an independent objective distinct from that of members; (ii) two or more IFIs will help the members unless external diseconomies exist among them; (iii) the free-rider problem of public goods can be resolved by conditionality but under a strict condition of perfect appropriability of surplus by principals, and (iv) if the IFI is situated between two risk neutral members like donor countries and recipient countries of IFI support, then the weakening of the power of monitoring disappears.https://www.worldscientific.com/doi/10.1142/S0116110598000049
spellingShingle Koichi Hamada
Incentive Mechanisms Surrounding International Financial Institutions
Asian Development Review
title Incentive Mechanisms Surrounding International Financial Institutions
title_full Incentive Mechanisms Surrounding International Financial Institutions
title_fullStr Incentive Mechanisms Surrounding International Financial Institutions
title_full_unstemmed Incentive Mechanisms Surrounding International Financial Institutions
title_short Incentive Mechanisms Surrounding International Financial Institutions
title_sort incentive mechanisms surrounding international financial institutions
url https://www.worldscientific.com/doi/10.1142/S0116110598000049
work_keys_str_mv AT koichihamada incentivemechanismssurroundinginternationalfinancialinstitutions