The Evolution and Reform of Palestinian Security Forces 1993-2013
This article provides a contextual analysis of the evolution and reform processes of Palestinian security forces over the last two decades. It categorises the evolution of security reform processes into three phases: the Oslo Accords phase; the Second Intifada phase; and the Fayyadism phase. The art...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Centre for Security Governance
2015-09-01
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| Series: | Stability : International Journal of Security and Development |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://www.stabilityjournal.org/articles/402 |
| _version_ | 1818326291680591872 |
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| author | Alaa Tartir |
| author_facet | Alaa Tartir |
| author_sort | Alaa Tartir |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | This article provides a contextual analysis of the evolution and reform processes of Palestinian security forces over the last two decades. It categorises the evolution of security reform processes into three phases: the Oslo Accords phase; the Second Intifada phase; and the Fayyadism phase. The article argues that despite the attempt to reverse the conditions of insecurity through security reform under Fayyadism (the Palestinian Authority’s state-building project between 2007–2013 in the occupied West Bank), fundamental tensions between the Palestinian Authority’s security forces and the Palestinian resistance movement have emerged. This tension manifested in authoritarian transformations and trends and therefore the entire security reform project constituted yet another form of institutionalised insecurity, but framed in a state-building and good governance framework. This article concludes that the enhanced functionality of the Palestinian Authority’s security forces and the reformed style of governance, resulted in the criminalisation of resistance against the Israeli occupation. In this way, the state-building project during the Fayyadism era directly and indirectly sustained the occupation. Conceptually, the Palestinian case demonstrates the fundamental flaws of conducting a security sector reform in the absence of sovereign authority and local ownership of the reform processes, and while living under a foreign military occupation. |
| first_indexed | 2024-12-13T11:58:03Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-b3226661f4b247fc84994929ceb7cc75 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 2165-2627 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-12-13T11:58:03Z |
| publishDate | 2015-09-01 |
| publisher | Centre for Security Governance |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Stability : International Journal of Security and Development |
| spelling | doaj.art-b3226661f4b247fc84994929ceb7cc752022-12-21T23:47:09ZengCentre for Security GovernanceStability : International Journal of Security and Development2165-26272015-09-014110.5334/sta.gi179The Evolution and Reform of Palestinian Security Forces 1993-2013Alaa Tartir0Department of International Development London School of Economics and Political Science, LSEThis article provides a contextual analysis of the evolution and reform processes of Palestinian security forces over the last two decades. It categorises the evolution of security reform processes into three phases: the Oslo Accords phase; the Second Intifada phase; and the Fayyadism phase. The article argues that despite the attempt to reverse the conditions of insecurity through security reform under Fayyadism (the Palestinian Authority’s state-building project between 2007–2013 in the occupied West Bank), fundamental tensions between the Palestinian Authority’s security forces and the Palestinian resistance movement have emerged. This tension manifested in authoritarian transformations and trends and therefore the entire security reform project constituted yet another form of institutionalised insecurity, but framed in a state-building and good governance framework. This article concludes that the enhanced functionality of the Palestinian Authority’s security forces and the reformed style of governance, resulted in the criminalisation of resistance against the Israeli occupation. In this way, the state-building project during the Fayyadism era directly and indirectly sustained the occupation. Conceptually, the Palestinian case demonstrates the fundamental flaws of conducting a security sector reform in the absence of sovereign authority and local ownership of the reform processes, and while living under a foreign military occupation.http://www.stabilityjournal.org/articles/402Security Sector ReformGovernanceState-buildingPalestinian AuthorityPalestinePalestinian-Israeli ConflictAuthoritarianismResistance. |
| spellingShingle | Alaa Tartir The Evolution and Reform of Palestinian Security Forces 1993-2013 Stability : International Journal of Security and Development Security Sector Reform Governance State-building Palestinian Authority Palestine Palestinian-Israeli Conflict Authoritarianism Resistance. |
| title | The Evolution and Reform of Palestinian Security Forces 1993-2013 |
| title_full | The Evolution and Reform of Palestinian Security Forces 1993-2013 |
| title_fullStr | The Evolution and Reform of Palestinian Security Forces 1993-2013 |
| title_full_unstemmed | The Evolution and Reform of Palestinian Security Forces 1993-2013 |
| title_short | The Evolution and Reform of Palestinian Security Forces 1993-2013 |
| title_sort | evolution and reform of palestinian security forces 1993 2013 |
| topic | Security Sector Reform Governance State-building Palestinian Authority Palestine Palestinian-Israeli Conflict Authoritarianism Resistance. |
| url | http://www.stabilityjournal.org/articles/402 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT alaatartir theevolutionandreformofpalestiniansecurityforces19932013 AT alaatartir evolutionandreformofpalestiniansecurityforces19932013 |