The reality of lies
A lie is neither a false proposition, nor a mistake, nor a mere fiction; it is a type of fiction, an act, and precisely an intentional act. An act calls for a subject, and therefore a lie is inseparable from its subject. Together, they make up a real object: it has to be real, since a lie produce...
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Format: | Article |
Language: | deu |
Published: |
Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory, Belgrade
2013-01-01
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Series: | Filozofija i Društvo |
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | http://www.doiserbia.nb.rs/img/doi/0353-5738/2013/0353-57381302105R.pdf |
Summary: | A lie is neither a false proposition, nor a mistake, nor a mere fiction; it is a type of fiction, an act, and precisely an intentional act. An act calls for a subject, and therefore a lie is inseparable from its subject. Together, they make up a real object: it has to be real, since a lie produces effects, and the cause-effect relationship only holds between real beings. Like every real object, a lie unfolds in a (phenomenological) context. But there is more: it identifies a (dialectical) context. |
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ISSN: | 0353-5738 |