Attacker Control and Impact for Confidentiality and Integrity
Language-based information flow methods offer a principled way to enforce strong security properties, but enforcing noninterference is too inflexible for realistic applications. Security-typed languages have therefore introduced declassification mechanisms for relaxing confidentiality policies, and...
Main Authors: | Aslan Askarov, Andrew Myers |
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Logical Methods in Computer Science e.V.
2011-09-01
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Series: | Logical Methods in Computer Science |
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | https://lmcs.episciences.org/987/pdf |
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