When Penalty Fails: Modeling Contractual Misincentives With Evidence From Portugal ITO Agreements
A misincentive is characterized as an incentive producing the opposite effect of motivating or preventing some specific action. In some circumstances, contract penalties such as sanctions and fines on late delivery or low-quality software encourage the irregularities instead of preventing them from...
Main Authors: | Thyago Celso Cavalcante Nepomuceno, Késsia Thais Cavalcanti Nepomuceno, Thiago Poleto, Victor Diogho Heuer de Carvalho, Ana Paula Cabral Seixas Costa |
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
SAGE Publishing
2022-12-01
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Series: | SAGE Open |
Online Access: | https://doi.org/10.1177/21582440221141850 |
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