Defense Against Protocol Level Attack in Tor Network using Deficit Round Robin Queuing Process
Among different types of network, Tor network is mostly referred as an onion-routing network which enables the anonymous communication and supports TCP applications over the network. The onion-routing is utilized by the Tor network for transmitting the information of users via virtual circuits which...
| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Elsevier
2018-11-01
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| Series: | Egyptian Informatics Journal |
| Online Access: | http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1110866517301457 |
| _version_ | 1818865078408052736 |
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| author | K. Sangeetha K. Ravikumar |
| author_facet | K. Sangeetha K. Ravikumar |
| author_sort | K. Sangeetha |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | Among different types of network, Tor network is mostly referred as an onion-routing network which enables the anonymous communication and supports TCP applications over the network. The onion-routing is utilized by the Tor network for transmitting the information of users via virtual circuits which are created by several successive relays. The performance and security of the anonymous communication in Tor network have been improved by using Novel Traffic Dividing and Scheduling (NTDS) mechanism. Normally, this mechanism was used for preventing the basic versions of sniper attacks in the Tor network. On the other hand, protocol-level attacks were not possible to prevent since some malicious entry router may duplicate, alter, insert or delete the TCP stream cells from the sender. This may cause cell recognition errors at the exit router and these cell recognition errors were recognized at the destination which helps to identify the sender. Hence, in this article, a defense mechanism called Mid-DRRQ is proposed for protocol-level attacks against Tor network. In Mid-DRRQ mechanism, the protocol-level attacks are prevented by using indistinguishability obfuscation model which generates the fake traffic within the middle relay. This fake traffic is allowed on outgoing connections without any cover traffic. Moreover, the outgoing connections of middle relays are controlled by using Deficit Round Robin queuing process. Finally, the simulation results show that the proposed mechanism effectively prevents the protocol-level attacks against Tor network. Keywords: Tor network, Novel traffic dividing and scheduling, Protocol-level attacks, Indistinguishability obfuscation, Fake traffic, Deficit Round Robin queuing |
| first_indexed | 2024-12-19T10:41:50Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-b4fcb81c3ba94f9eb5eddeb5456a26db |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 1110-8665 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-12-19T10:41:50Z |
| publishDate | 2018-11-01 |
| publisher | Elsevier |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Egyptian Informatics Journal |
| spelling | doaj.art-b4fcb81c3ba94f9eb5eddeb5456a26db2022-12-21T20:25:26ZengElsevierEgyptian Informatics Journal1110-86652018-11-01193199205Defense Against Protocol Level Attack in Tor Network using Deficit Round Robin Queuing ProcessK. Sangeetha0K. Ravikumar1Bharathiyar University, Coimbatore, India; Corresponding author at: 440/2, Murugalayam, Water Board Colony, Kattur, Alagapuram, Salem 636016, India.Faculty of Computer Science Department, Tamil University, IndiaAmong different types of network, Tor network is mostly referred as an onion-routing network which enables the anonymous communication and supports TCP applications over the network. The onion-routing is utilized by the Tor network for transmitting the information of users via virtual circuits which are created by several successive relays. The performance and security of the anonymous communication in Tor network have been improved by using Novel Traffic Dividing and Scheduling (NTDS) mechanism. Normally, this mechanism was used for preventing the basic versions of sniper attacks in the Tor network. On the other hand, protocol-level attacks were not possible to prevent since some malicious entry router may duplicate, alter, insert or delete the TCP stream cells from the sender. This may cause cell recognition errors at the exit router and these cell recognition errors were recognized at the destination which helps to identify the sender. Hence, in this article, a defense mechanism called Mid-DRRQ is proposed for protocol-level attacks against Tor network. In Mid-DRRQ mechanism, the protocol-level attacks are prevented by using indistinguishability obfuscation model which generates the fake traffic within the middle relay. This fake traffic is allowed on outgoing connections without any cover traffic. Moreover, the outgoing connections of middle relays are controlled by using Deficit Round Robin queuing process. Finally, the simulation results show that the proposed mechanism effectively prevents the protocol-level attacks against Tor network. Keywords: Tor network, Novel traffic dividing and scheduling, Protocol-level attacks, Indistinguishability obfuscation, Fake traffic, Deficit Round Robin queuinghttp://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1110866517301457 |
| spellingShingle | K. Sangeetha K. Ravikumar Defense Against Protocol Level Attack in Tor Network using Deficit Round Robin Queuing Process Egyptian Informatics Journal |
| title | Defense Against Protocol Level Attack in Tor Network using Deficit Round Robin Queuing Process |
| title_full | Defense Against Protocol Level Attack in Tor Network using Deficit Round Robin Queuing Process |
| title_fullStr | Defense Against Protocol Level Attack in Tor Network using Deficit Round Robin Queuing Process |
| title_full_unstemmed | Defense Against Protocol Level Attack in Tor Network using Deficit Round Robin Queuing Process |
| title_short | Defense Against Protocol Level Attack in Tor Network using Deficit Round Robin Queuing Process |
| title_sort | defense against protocol level attack in tor network using deficit round robin queuing process |
| url | http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1110866517301457 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT ksangeetha defenseagainstprotocollevelattackintornetworkusingdeficitroundrobinqueuingprocess AT kravikumar defenseagainstprotocollevelattackintornetworkusingdeficitroundrobinqueuingprocess |