Cooperation in Public Goods Games: Stay, But Not for Too Long
Cooperation in repeated public goods game is hardly achieved, unless contingent behavior is present. Surely, if mechanisms promoting positive assortment between cooperators are present, then cooperators may beat defectors, because cooperators would collect greater payoffs. In the context of evolutio...
| Հիմնական հեղինակներ: | , |
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| Ձևաչափ: | Հոդված |
| Լեզու: | English |
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MDPI AG
2017-08-01
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| Շարք: | Games |
| Խորագրեր: | |
| Առցանց հասանելիություն: | https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/8/3/35 |
| _version_ | 1830475782219104256 |
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| author | Lucas Wardil Marco Antonio Amaral |
| author_facet | Lucas Wardil Marco Antonio Amaral |
| author_sort | Lucas Wardil |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | Cooperation in repeated public goods game is hardly achieved, unless contingent behavior is present. Surely, if mechanisms promoting positive assortment between cooperators are present, then cooperators may beat defectors, because cooperators would collect greater payoffs. In the context of evolutionary game theory, individuals that always cooperate cannot win the competition against defectors in well-mixed populations. Here, we study the evolution of a population where fitness is obtained in repeated public goods games and players have a fixed probability of playing the next round. As a result, the group size decreases during the game. The population is well-mixed and there are only two available strategies: always cooperate (ALLC) or always defect (ALLD). Through numerical calculation and analytical approximations we show that cooperation can emerge if the players stay playing the game, but not for too long. The essential mechanism is the interaction between the transition from strong to weak altruism, as the group size decreases, and the existence of an upper limit to the number of rounds representing limited time availability. |
| first_indexed | 2024-12-21T15:42:00Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-b51aa20654b84a6eabb16bf4ffbb18c0 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 2073-4336 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-12-21T15:42:00Z |
| publishDate | 2017-08-01 |
| publisher | MDPI AG |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Games |
| spelling | doaj.art-b51aa20654b84a6eabb16bf4ffbb18c02022-12-21T18:58:28ZengMDPI AGGames2073-43362017-08-01833510.3390/g8030035g8030035Cooperation in Public Goods Games: Stay, But Not for Too LongLucas Wardil0Marco Antonio Amaral1Departamento de Física, Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais, Caixa Postal 702, Belo Horizonte CEP 30161-970, MG, BrazilInstituto de Física, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul, Caixa Postal 15051, Porto Alegre CEP 91501-970, RS, BrazilCooperation in repeated public goods game is hardly achieved, unless contingent behavior is present. Surely, if mechanisms promoting positive assortment between cooperators are present, then cooperators may beat defectors, because cooperators would collect greater payoffs. In the context of evolutionary game theory, individuals that always cooperate cannot win the competition against defectors in well-mixed populations. Here, we study the evolution of a population where fitness is obtained in repeated public goods games and players have a fixed probability of playing the next round. As a result, the group size decreases during the game. The population is well-mixed and there are only two available strategies: always cooperate (ALLC) or always defect (ALLD). Through numerical calculation and analytical approximations we show that cooperation can emerge if the players stay playing the game, but not for too long. The essential mechanism is the interaction between the transition from strong to weak altruism, as the group size decreases, and the existence of an upper limit to the number of rounds representing limited time availability.https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/8/3/35evolutionary game theorypublic goods gamerepeated gamesfixation probability |
| spellingShingle | Lucas Wardil Marco Antonio Amaral Cooperation in Public Goods Games: Stay, But Not for Too Long Games evolutionary game theory public goods game repeated games fixation probability |
| title | Cooperation in Public Goods Games: Stay, But Not for Too Long |
| title_full | Cooperation in Public Goods Games: Stay, But Not for Too Long |
| title_fullStr | Cooperation in Public Goods Games: Stay, But Not for Too Long |
| title_full_unstemmed | Cooperation in Public Goods Games: Stay, But Not for Too Long |
| title_short | Cooperation in Public Goods Games: Stay, But Not for Too Long |
| title_sort | cooperation in public goods games stay but not for too long |
| topic | evolutionary game theory public goods game repeated games fixation probability |
| url | https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/8/3/35 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT lucaswardil cooperationinpublicgoodsgamesstaybutnotfortoolong AT marcoantonioamaral cooperationinpublicgoodsgamesstaybutnotfortoolong |