Cooperation in Public Goods Games: Stay, But Not for Too Long
Cooperation in repeated public goods game is hardly achieved, unless contingent behavior is present. Surely, if mechanisms promoting positive assortment between cooperators are present, then cooperators may beat defectors, because cooperators would collect greater payoffs. In the context of evolutio...
Autors principals: | Lucas Wardil, Marco Antonio Amaral |
---|---|
Format: | Article |
Idioma: | English |
Publicat: |
MDPI AG
2017-08-01
|
Col·lecció: | Games |
Matèries: | |
Accés en línia: | https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/8/3/35 |
Ítems similars
-
Evolutionary Games and Dynamics in Public Goods Supply with Repetitive Actions
per: Simo Sun, et al.
Publicat: (2021-07-01) -
A reversed form of public goods game: equivalence and difference
per: Chaoqian Wang, et al.
Publicat: (2022-01-01) -
Evolution of Global Cooperation in Multi-Level Threshold Public Goods Games With Income Redistribution
per: Jinming Du, et al.
Publicat: (2018-07-01) -
Fractional Punishment of Free Riders to Improve Cooperation in Optional Public Good Games
per: Rocio Botta, et al.
Publicat: (2021-02-01) -
Cooperation and Coordination in Threshold Public Goods Games with Asymmetric Players
per: Xinmiao An, et al.
Publicat: (2023-12-01)