Cooperation in Public Goods Games: Stay, But Not for Too Long
Cooperation in repeated public goods game is hardly achieved, unless contingent behavior is present. Surely, if mechanisms promoting positive assortment between cooperators are present, then cooperators may beat defectors, because cooperators would collect greater payoffs. In the context of evolutio...
Glavni autori: | Lucas Wardil, Marco Antonio Amaral |
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Format: | Članak |
Jezik: | English |
Izdano: |
MDPI AG
2017-08-01
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Serija: | Games |
Teme: | |
Online pristup: | https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/8/3/35 |
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