Cooperation in Public Goods Games: Stay, But Not for Too Long
Cooperation in repeated public goods game is hardly achieved, unless contingent behavior is present. Surely, if mechanisms promoting positive assortment between cooperators are present, then cooperators may beat defectors, because cooperators would collect greater payoffs. In the context of evolutio...
主要な著者: | Lucas Wardil, Marco Antonio Amaral |
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フォーマット: | 論文 |
言語: | English |
出版事項: |
MDPI AG
2017-08-01
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シリーズ: | Games |
主題: | |
オンライン・アクセス: | https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/8/3/35 |
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