Cooperation in Public Goods Games: Stay, But Not for Too Long
Cooperation in repeated public goods game is hardly achieved, unless contingent behavior is present. Surely, if mechanisms promoting positive assortment between cooperators are present, then cooperators may beat defectors, because cooperators would collect greater payoffs. In the context of evolutio...
Үндсэн зохиолчид: | Lucas Wardil, Marco Antonio Amaral |
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Формат: | Өгүүллэг |
Хэл сонгох: | English |
Хэвлэсэн: |
MDPI AG
2017-08-01
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Цуврал: | Games |
Нөхцлүүд: | |
Онлайн хандалт: | https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/8/3/35 |
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