Cooperation in Public Goods Games: Stay, But Not for Too Long
Cooperation in repeated public goods game is hardly achieved, unless contingent behavior is present. Surely, if mechanisms promoting positive assortment between cooperators are present, then cooperators may beat defectors, because cooperators would collect greater payoffs. In the context of evolutio...
| Những tác giả chính: | , |
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| Định dạng: | Bài viết |
| Ngôn ngữ: | English |
| Được phát hành: |
MDPI AG
2017-08-01
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| Loạt: | Games |
| Những chủ đề: | |
| Truy cập trực tuyến: | https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/8/3/35 |