Inconvenient Truth and Inductive Risk in Covid-19 Science
To clarify the proper role of values in science, focusing on controversial expert responses to Covid-19, this article examines the status of (in)convenient hypotheses. Polarizing cases like health experts downplaying mask efficacy to save resources for healthcare workers, or scientists dismissing “a...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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University Library System, University of Pittsburgh
2022-12-01
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| Series: | Philosophy of Medicine |
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| Online Access: | https://philmed.pitt.edu/philmed/article/view/132 |
| _version_ | 1811199997141581824 |
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| author | Eli I. Lichtenstein |
| author_facet | Eli I. Lichtenstein |
| author_sort | Eli I. Lichtenstein |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | To clarify the proper role of values in science, focusing on controversial expert responses to Covid-19, this article examines the status of (in)convenient hypotheses. Polarizing cases like health experts downplaying mask efficacy to save resources for healthcare workers, or scientists dismissing “accidental lab leak” hypotheses in view of potential xenophobia, plausibly involve modifying evidential standards for (in)convenient claims. Societies could accept that scientists handle (in)convenient claims just like nonscientists, and give experts less political power. Or societies could hold scientists to a higher bar, by expecting them not to modify evidential standards to avoid costs only incidentally tied to error. |
| first_indexed | 2024-04-12T01:57:26Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-b6b491c8f69c4d4aa40a679bf2ecb5c5 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 2692-3963 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-04-12T01:57:26Z |
| publishDate | 2022-12-01 |
| publisher | University Library System, University of Pittsburgh |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Philosophy of Medicine |
| spelling | doaj.art-b6b491c8f69c4d4aa40a679bf2ecb5c52022-12-22T03:52:47ZengUniversity Library System, University of PittsburghPhilosophy of Medicine2692-39632022-12-013110.5195/pom.2022.132Inconvenient Truth and Inductive Risk in Covid-19 ScienceEli I. Lichtenstein0School of Philosophy, Psychology and Language Sciences, University of Edinburgh, ScotlandTo clarify the proper role of values in science, focusing on controversial expert responses to Covid-19, this article examines the status of (in)convenient hypotheses. Polarizing cases like health experts downplaying mask efficacy to save resources for healthcare workers, or scientists dismissing “accidental lab leak” hypotheses in view of potential xenophobia, plausibly involve modifying evidential standards for (in)convenient claims. Societies could accept that scientists handle (in)convenient claims just like nonscientists, and give experts less political power. Or societies could hold scientists to a higher bar, by expecting them not to modify evidential standards to avoid costs only incidentally tied to error. https://philmed.pitt.edu/philmed/article/view/132Values in ScienceNoble LieEpistemic RiskTrustPublic Health Ethics |
| spellingShingle | Eli I. Lichtenstein Inconvenient Truth and Inductive Risk in Covid-19 Science Philosophy of Medicine Values in Science Noble Lie Epistemic Risk Trust Public Health Ethics |
| title | Inconvenient Truth and Inductive Risk in Covid-19 Science |
| title_full | Inconvenient Truth and Inductive Risk in Covid-19 Science |
| title_fullStr | Inconvenient Truth and Inductive Risk in Covid-19 Science |
| title_full_unstemmed | Inconvenient Truth and Inductive Risk in Covid-19 Science |
| title_short | Inconvenient Truth and Inductive Risk in Covid-19 Science |
| title_sort | inconvenient truth and inductive risk in covid 19 science |
| topic | Values in Science Noble Lie Epistemic Risk Trust Public Health Ethics |
| url | https://philmed.pitt.edu/philmed/article/view/132 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT eliilichtenstein inconvenienttruthandinductiveriskincovid19science |