Possibilia, Qualia, and Sensibilia
In this article I shall first and foremost attempt to show that the semantic requirements of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus logico-philosophicus intend the objects of the Tractatus to be conceived of as possibilia in the Russellian sense of 1903, i.e., as objects that may exist or may not exist; secondly,...
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Editora Universitária Champagnat - PUCPRESS
2022-12-01
|
| Series: | Revista de Filosofia |
| Online Access: | https://periodicos.pucpr.br/aurora/article/view/29120 |
| Summary: | In this article I shall first and foremost attempt to show that the semantic requirements of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus logico-philosophicus intend the objects of the Tractatus to be conceived of as possibilia in the Russellian sense of 1903, i.e., as objects that may exist or may not exist; secondly, that the general ontology of the Tractatus suggests integrating this onto-semantic conception with a conception of these objects not properly as qualia but as sensibilia in the Russellian sense of 1914, i.e., as sense-data that may exist or may not exist. |
|---|---|
| ISSN: | 0104-4443 1980-5934 |