Estimates of the Potential Indirect Damage to China by Restricting Energy Increase to Peak Carbon Emissions
Abstract Balanced against this increase in energy demand are energy security and climate warming issues. Restricting the increase in energy demand for peaking carbon emissions will not only directly affect production in sectors but also cause a broader indirect economic impact through intricate indu...
Main Authors: | , , , |
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
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Wiley
2022-11-01
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Series: | Earth's Future |
Online Access: | https://doi.org/10.1029/2022EF002697 |
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author | Chengfang Huang Ning Li Zhengtao Zhang Fenggui Liu |
author_facet | Chengfang Huang Ning Li Zhengtao Zhang Fenggui Liu |
author_sort | Chengfang Huang |
collection | DOAJ |
description | Abstract Balanced against this increase in energy demand are energy security and climate warming issues. Restricting the increase in energy demand for peaking carbon emissions will not only directly affect production in sectors but also cause a broader indirect economic impact through intricate industrial linkages. Under the two requirements of adapting to warming and peaking carbon emissions before 2030, we accordingly constructed developmental and restrictive scenarios of China and improved the adaptive Input–Output model from the demand side to evaluate the indirect economic impact. The main findings were as follows: (a) the increase in end‐use demand for conventional energy in 2030 will be 24.43% of energy consumption in 2017 (TEC2017) under the restrictive scenario, and the reduction of this increase will be about 42.98% of TEC2017 in comparison with the developmental scenario. (b) Due to this reduction, the possible indirect damage in 2030 will be 14.96% of the GDP in 2017, and the clean energy level in 2030 will be 20 times the hydropower generation in 2017, which can offset this damage. (c) The industrial sector with high output and high energy will suffer the most indirect damage. The quantitative results demonstrate the great challenges that China will face in clean energy transition. |
first_indexed | 2024-03-08T23:59:02Z |
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id | doaj.art-b8c4a7f2fa6a4ae8acd48b07d751e262 |
institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
issn | 2328-4277 |
language | English |
last_indexed | 2024-03-08T23:59:02Z |
publishDate | 2022-11-01 |
publisher | Wiley |
record_format | Article |
series | Earth's Future |
spelling | doaj.art-b8c4a7f2fa6a4ae8acd48b07d751e2622023-12-12T22:01:38ZengWileyEarth's Future2328-42772022-11-011011n/an/a10.1029/2022EF002697Estimates of the Potential Indirect Damage to China by Restricting Energy Increase to Peak Carbon EmissionsChengfang Huang0Ning Li1Zhengtao Zhang2Fenggui Liu3Key Laboratory of Environmental Change and Natural Disaster Ministry of Education Beijing Normal University Beijing ChinaSchool of National Safety and Emergency Management Beijing Normal University Beijing ChinaKey Laboratory of Environmental Change and Natural Disaster Ministry of Education Beijing Normal University Beijing ChinaAcademy of Plateau Science and Sustainability Qinghai Normal University Xining ChinaAbstract Balanced against this increase in energy demand are energy security and climate warming issues. Restricting the increase in energy demand for peaking carbon emissions will not only directly affect production in sectors but also cause a broader indirect economic impact through intricate industrial linkages. Under the two requirements of adapting to warming and peaking carbon emissions before 2030, we accordingly constructed developmental and restrictive scenarios of China and improved the adaptive Input–Output model from the demand side to evaluate the indirect economic impact. The main findings were as follows: (a) the increase in end‐use demand for conventional energy in 2030 will be 24.43% of energy consumption in 2017 (TEC2017) under the restrictive scenario, and the reduction of this increase will be about 42.98% of TEC2017 in comparison with the developmental scenario. (b) Due to this reduction, the possible indirect damage in 2030 will be 14.96% of the GDP in 2017, and the clean energy level in 2030 will be 20 times the hydropower generation in 2017, which can offset this damage. (c) The industrial sector with high output and high energy will suffer the most indirect damage. The quantitative results demonstrate the great challenges that China will face in clean energy transition.https://doi.org/10.1029/2022EF002697 |
spellingShingle | Chengfang Huang Ning Li Zhengtao Zhang Fenggui Liu Estimates of the Potential Indirect Damage to China by Restricting Energy Increase to Peak Carbon Emissions Earth's Future |
title | Estimates of the Potential Indirect Damage to China by Restricting Energy Increase to Peak Carbon Emissions |
title_full | Estimates of the Potential Indirect Damage to China by Restricting Energy Increase to Peak Carbon Emissions |
title_fullStr | Estimates of the Potential Indirect Damage to China by Restricting Energy Increase to Peak Carbon Emissions |
title_full_unstemmed | Estimates of the Potential Indirect Damage to China by Restricting Energy Increase to Peak Carbon Emissions |
title_short | Estimates of the Potential Indirect Damage to China by Restricting Energy Increase to Peak Carbon Emissions |
title_sort | estimates of the potential indirect damage to china by restricting energy increase to peak carbon emissions |
url | https://doi.org/10.1029/2022EF002697 |
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