| Summary: | Harmful acts are
punished more often and more harshly than harmful omissions. This asymmetry has
variously been ascribed to differences in how individuals perceive the causal
responsibility of acts versus omissions and to social norms that tend to
proscribe acts more frequently than omissions. This paper examines both of
these hypotheses, in conjunction with a new hypothesis: that acts are punished
more than omissions because it is usually more efficient to do so. In typical
settings, harms occur as a result of relatively few harmful actions, but many
individuals may have had the opportunity to prevent or rectify the harm.
Penalising actors therefore requires relatively few punishment events compared
to punishing omitters. We employ a novel group paradigm in which harm occurs
only if both actors and omitters contribute to the harm. Subjects play a
repeated economic game in fixed groups involving a social dilemma (total N =
580): on each round self-interest favours harmful actions (taking from another)
and harmful omissions (failing to repair the victim’s loss), but the group
payoff is maximized if individuals refrain from these behaviors. In one
treatment harm occurs as a result of one action and two omissions; in the
other, it is the result of two actions and one omission. In the second
treatment, the more efficient strategy to maximize group benefit is to punish
omissions. We find that subjects continue to prefer to punish acts rather than
omissions, with two important caveats. There is still a substantial level of
punishment of omissions, and there is also evidence of some responsiveness to
the opportunity to enforce a more efficient rule. Further analysis addresses
whether the omission effect is associated with asymmetric norm-based attitudes:
a substantial proportion of subjects regard it as equally fair to punish
harmful acts and omissions, while another portion endorse an asymmetry; and
punishment behavior correlates with these attitudes in both groups.
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