When your anchor sinks your boat: Information asymmetry in distributive negotiations and the disadvantage of making the first offer
The literature on behavioral decision-making and negotiations to date usually advocates first-mover advantage in distributive negotiations, and bases this preference on the anchoring heuristic. In the following paper, we suggest that the preference for moving first vs. moving second in negotiations...
| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Cambridge University Press
2017-09-01
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| Series: | Judgment and Decision Making |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S193029750000646X/type/journal_article |
| _version_ | 1797701758521180160 |
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| author | Yossi Maaravi Aharon Levy |
| author_facet | Yossi Maaravi Aharon Levy |
| author_sort | Yossi Maaravi |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | The literature on behavioral decision-making and negotiations to date usually advocates first-mover advantage in distributive negotiations, and bases this preference on the anchoring heuristic. In the following paper, we suggest that the preference for moving first vs. moving second in negotiations may not be as clear-cut as presumed, especially in situations characterized by information asymmetry between negotiating counterparts. In Study 1, we examined people’s initiation preferences and found that unless taught otherwise, people intuitively often prefer to move second. In Studies 2–4, we experimentally tested the suggested advantage of moving second, and demonstrated that in information-asymmetry scenarios – when one party has perfect background information and the other has none — it is actually preferable for both counterparts not to give the first offer while negotiating. We discuss the implications of our findings on the field of negotiation and decision-making, and lay the groundwork for future studies examining this issue. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-12T04:40:21Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-b91fa31e3247400aa59fb7b27048a83c |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 1930-2975 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-12T04:40:21Z |
| publishDate | 2017-09-01 |
| publisher | Cambridge University Press |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Judgment and Decision Making |
| spelling | doaj.art-b91fa31e3247400aa59fb7b27048a83c2023-09-03T09:45:41ZengCambridge University PressJudgment and Decision Making1930-29752017-09-011242042910.1017/S193029750000646XWhen your anchor sinks your boat: Information asymmetry in distributive negotiations and the disadvantage of making the first offerYossi Maaravi0Aharon Levy1The Adelson School of Entrepreneurship, Interdisciplinary Center (IDC), Herzliya. P.O. Box 167 Herzliya, 4610101, IsraelThe Baruch Ivcher School of Psychology, Interdisciplinary Center (IDC), Herzliya & The Heymans Institute for Psychological Research, University of GroningenThe literature on behavioral decision-making and negotiations to date usually advocates first-mover advantage in distributive negotiations, and bases this preference on the anchoring heuristic. In the following paper, we suggest that the preference for moving first vs. moving second in negotiations may not be as clear-cut as presumed, especially in situations characterized by information asymmetry between negotiating counterparts. In Study 1, we examined people’s initiation preferences and found that unless taught otherwise, people intuitively often prefer to move second. In Studies 2–4, we experimentally tested the suggested advantage of moving second, and demonstrated that in information-asymmetry scenarios – when one party has perfect background information and the other has none — it is actually preferable for both counterparts not to give the first offer while negotiating. We discuss the implications of our findings on the field of negotiation and decision-making, and lay the groundwork for future studies examining this issue.https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S193029750000646X/type/journal_articlefirst offeranchoringnegotiationsecond offersecond-mover advantageinformation asymmetry |
| spellingShingle | Yossi Maaravi Aharon Levy When your anchor sinks your boat: Information asymmetry in distributive negotiations and the disadvantage of making the first offer Judgment and Decision Making first offer anchoring negotiation second offer second-mover advantage information asymmetry |
| title | When your anchor sinks your boat: Information asymmetry in distributive negotiations and the disadvantage of making the first offer |
| title_full | When your anchor sinks your boat: Information asymmetry in distributive negotiations and the disadvantage of making the first offer |
| title_fullStr | When your anchor sinks your boat: Information asymmetry in distributive negotiations and the disadvantage of making the first offer |
| title_full_unstemmed | When your anchor sinks your boat: Information asymmetry in distributive negotiations and the disadvantage of making the first offer |
| title_short | When your anchor sinks your boat: Information asymmetry in distributive negotiations and the disadvantage of making the first offer |
| title_sort | when your anchor sinks your boat information asymmetry in distributive negotiations and the disadvantage of making the first offer |
| topic | first offer anchoring negotiation second offer second-mover advantage information asymmetry |
| url | https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S193029750000646X/type/journal_article |
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