Minimal dualism and epistemic approach

In this paper the author presents an argument in favor of minimal dualism — thesis, according to which conscious agents are able to exist without bodies. Author demonstrates the advantages of this argument. Firstly, he shows that this argument is invulnerable to the epistemic strategy of criticiz...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: B. V. Faul
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Omsk State Technical University, Federal State Autonomous Educational Institution of Higher Education 2021-02-01
Series:Омский научный вестник: Серия "Общество. История. Современность"
Subjects:
Online Access:https://www.omgtu.ru/general_information/media_omgtu/journal_of_omsk_research_journal/files/arhiv/2021/%D0%A2.%206,%20%E2%84%96%201%20(%D0%9E%D0%98%D0%A1)/86-90%20%D0%A4%D0%B0%D1%83%D0%BB%D1%8C%20%D0%91.%20%D0%92..pdf
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Summary:In this paper the author presents an argument in favor of minimal dualism — thesis, according to which conscious agents are able to exist without bodies. Author demonstrates the advantages of this argument. Firstly, he shows that this argument is invulnerable to the epistemic strategy of criticizing the conceivability argument. Secondly, the epistemic approach restricts the conceivability of creatures, the possibility of which is incompatible with the minimal dualism
ISSN:2542-0488
2541-7983