Defending Multiple Terrorist Targets

This paper analyzes a situation where multiple targets are exposed to a potential terrorist attack. The probability of an attack is determined endogenously in a game where a terrorist chooses the target while the targets independently determine the level of deterrence. As each target tries to divert...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Lee, Sang hoon
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Korea Development Institute 2013-09-01
Series:KDI Journal of Economic Policy
Subjects:
Online Access:https://doi.org/10.23895/kdijep.2013.35.3.91
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author Lee, Sang hoon
author_facet Lee, Sang hoon
author_sort Lee, Sang hoon
collection DOAJ
description This paper analyzes a situation where multiple targets are exposed to a potential terrorist attack. The probability of an attack is determined endogenously in a game where a terrorist chooses the target while the targets independently determine the level of deterrence. As each target tries to divert an attack to others, the symmetric equilibrium becomes suboptimal and exhibits dispersion in the level of deterrence. The analysis shows that the first best deterrence level may be achieved when the targets can write a binding risk-sharing contract. Such a contract has limited applicability however as it suffers from a potential verification problem.
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spelling doaj.art-bb2be28f1cb44edaa32edacc6a2281022022-12-21T18:44:25ZengKorea Development InstituteKDI Journal of Economic Policy2586-29952586-41302013-09-013539112410.23895/kdijep.2013.35.3.91Defending Multiple Terrorist TargetsLee, Sang hoon0Assistant Professor, College of International Studies, Hallym UniversityThis paper analyzes a situation where multiple targets are exposed to a potential terrorist attack. The probability of an attack is determined endogenously in a game where a terrorist chooses the target while the targets independently determine the level of deterrence. As each target tries to divert an attack to others, the symmetric equilibrium becomes suboptimal and exhibits dispersion in the level of deterrence. The analysis shows that the first best deterrence level may be achieved when the targets can write a binding risk-sharing contract. Such a contract has limited applicability however as it suffers from a potential verification problem.https://doi.org/10.23895/kdijep.2013.35.3.91Terrorism(테러리즘)Counterterrorism(대테러)Contract(계약)
spellingShingle Lee, Sang hoon
Defending Multiple Terrorist Targets
KDI Journal of Economic Policy
Terrorism(테러리즘)
Counterterrorism(대테러)
Contract(계약)
title Defending Multiple Terrorist Targets
title_full Defending Multiple Terrorist Targets
title_fullStr Defending Multiple Terrorist Targets
title_full_unstemmed Defending Multiple Terrorist Targets
title_short Defending Multiple Terrorist Targets
title_sort defending multiple terrorist targets
topic Terrorism(테러리즘)
Counterterrorism(대테러)
Contract(계약)
url https://doi.org/10.23895/kdijep.2013.35.3.91
work_keys_str_mv AT leesanghoon defendingmultipleterroristtargets