A Cooperative Network Packing Game with Simple Paths

We consider a cooperative packing game in which the characteristic function is defined as the maximum number of independent simple paths of a fixed length included in a given coalition. The conditions under which the core exists in this game are established, and its form is obtained. For several par...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Sergei Dotsenko, Vladimir Mazalov
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: MDPI AG 2021-07-01
Series:Mathematics
Subjects:
Online Access:https://www.mdpi.com/2227-7390/9/14/1683
Description
Summary:We consider a cooperative packing game in which the characteristic function is defined as the maximum number of independent simple paths of a fixed length included in a given coalition. The conditions under which the core exists in this game are established, and its form is obtained. For several particular graphs, the explicit form of the core is presented.
ISSN:2227-7390