Multi-Domain Network Slicing in Satellite–Terrestrial Integrated Networks: A Multi-Sided Ascending-Price Auction Approach
With the growing demand for massive access and data transmission requests, terrestrial communication systems are inefficient in providing satisfactory services. Compared with terrestrial communication networks, satellite communication networks have the advantages of wide coverage and support for mas...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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MDPI AG
2023-09-01
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| Series: | Aerospace |
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| Online Access: | https://www.mdpi.com/2226-4310/10/10/830 |
| _version_ | 1827722156711084032 |
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| author | Weiwei Jiang Yafeng Zhan Xiaolong Xiao |
| author_facet | Weiwei Jiang Yafeng Zhan Xiaolong Xiao |
| author_sort | Weiwei Jiang |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | With the growing demand for massive access and data transmission requests, terrestrial communication systems are inefficient in providing satisfactory services. Compared with terrestrial communication networks, satellite communication networks have the advantages of wide coverage and support for massive access services. Satellite–terrestrial integrated networks are indispensable parts of future B5G/6G networks. Challenges arise for implementing and operating a successful satellite–terrestrial integrated network, including differentiated user requirements, infrastructure compatibility, limited resource constraints, and service provider incentives. In order to support diversified services, a multi-domain network slicing approach is proposed in this study, in which network resources from both terrestrial and satellite networks are combined to build alternative routes when serving the same slice request as virtual private networks. To improve the utilization efficiency of limited resources, slice admission control is formulated as a mechanism design problem. To encourage participation and cooperation among different service providers, a multi-sided ascending-price auction mechanism is further proposed as a game theory-based solution for slice admission control and resource allocation, in which multiple strategic service providers maximize their own utilities by trading bandwidth resources. The proposed auction mechanism is proven to be strongly budget-balanced, individually rational, and obviously truthful. To validate the effectiveness of the proposed approach, real-world historical traffic data are used in the simulation experiments and the results show that the proposed approach is asymptotically optimal with the increase in users and competitive with the polynomial-time optimal trade mechanism, in terms of admission ratio and service provider profit. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-10T21:31:37Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-bb8fa27e5e5042b9bc12b09f3c3a07a9 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 2226-4310 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-10T21:31:37Z |
| publishDate | 2023-09-01 |
| publisher | MDPI AG |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Aerospace |
| spelling | doaj.art-bb8fa27e5e5042b9bc12b09f3c3a07a92023-11-19T15:16:45ZengMDPI AGAerospace2226-43102023-09-01101083010.3390/aerospace10100830Multi-Domain Network Slicing in Satellite–Terrestrial Integrated Networks: A Multi-Sided Ascending-Price Auction ApproachWeiwei Jiang0Yafeng Zhan1Xiaolong Xiao2Department of Electronic Engineering, Tsinghua University, Beijing 100084, ChinaDepartment of Electronic Engineering, Tsinghua University, Beijing 100084, ChinaState Grid Jiangsu Electric Power Co., Ltd., Research Institute, Nanjing 211103, ChinaWith the growing demand for massive access and data transmission requests, terrestrial communication systems are inefficient in providing satisfactory services. Compared with terrestrial communication networks, satellite communication networks have the advantages of wide coverage and support for massive access services. Satellite–terrestrial integrated networks are indispensable parts of future B5G/6G networks. Challenges arise for implementing and operating a successful satellite–terrestrial integrated network, including differentiated user requirements, infrastructure compatibility, limited resource constraints, and service provider incentives. In order to support diversified services, a multi-domain network slicing approach is proposed in this study, in which network resources from both terrestrial and satellite networks are combined to build alternative routes when serving the same slice request as virtual private networks. To improve the utilization efficiency of limited resources, slice admission control is formulated as a mechanism design problem. To encourage participation and cooperation among different service providers, a multi-sided ascending-price auction mechanism is further proposed as a game theory-based solution for slice admission control and resource allocation, in which multiple strategic service providers maximize their own utilities by trading bandwidth resources. The proposed auction mechanism is proven to be strongly budget-balanced, individually rational, and obviously truthful. To validate the effectiveness of the proposed approach, real-world historical traffic data are used in the simulation experiments and the results show that the proposed approach is asymptotically optimal with the increase in users and competitive with the polynomial-time optimal trade mechanism, in terms of admission ratio and service provider profit.https://www.mdpi.com/2226-4310/10/10/830admission controlgame theorymulti-domain network slicingmulti-sided ascending-price auctionsatellite–terrestrial integrated network |
| spellingShingle | Weiwei Jiang Yafeng Zhan Xiaolong Xiao Multi-Domain Network Slicing in Satellite–Terrestrial Integrated Networks: A Multi-Sided Ascending-Price Auction Approach Aerospace admission control game theory multi-domain network slicing multi-sided ascending-price auction satellite–terrestrial integrated network |
| title | Multi-Domain Network Slicing in Satellite–Terrestrial Integrated Networks: A Multi-Sided Ascending-Price Auction Approach |
| title_full | Multi-Domain Network Slicing in Satellite–Terrestrial Integrated Networks: A Multi-Sided Ascending-Price Auction Approach |
| title_fullStr | Multi-Domain Network Slicing in Satellite–Terrestrial Integrated Networks: A Multi-Sided Ascending-Price Auction Approach |
| title_full_unstemmed | Multi-Domain Network Slicing in Satellite–Terrestrial Integrated Networks: A Multi-Sided Ascending-Price Auction Approach |
| title_short | Multi-Domain Network Slicing in Satellite–Terrestrial Integrated Networks: A Multi-Sided Ascending-Price Auction Approach |
| title_sort | multi domain network slicing in satellite terrestrial integrated networks a multi sided ascending price auction approach |
| topic | admission control game theory multi-domain network slicing multi-sided ascending-price auction satellite–terrestrial integrated network |
| url | https://www.mdpi.com/2226-4310/10/10/830 |
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