Matching-Updating Mechanism: A Solution for the Stable Marriage Problem with Dynamic Preferences
We studied the stable marriage problem with dynamic preferences. The dynamic preference model allows the agent to change its preferences at any time, which may cause instability in a matching. However, preference changing in SMP instances does not necessarily break all pairs of an existing match. So...
Main Authors: | Akhmad Alimudin, Yoshiteru Ishida |
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
MDPI AG
2022-02-01
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Series: | Entropy |
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | https://www.mdpi.com/1099-4300/24/2/263 |
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